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I. COMMON CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS 
 
1. Common constitutional traditions: Foundations, content and society 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 Both the constitutional movement (XVIII) and the normative force of the 
constitution (XX) have been caught up by “a constitutional storm, with the strong winds 
of globalization and supranational integration threating the current constitutional 
architecture”.2 The constitutional space has become permeable to other legal sources, 
allowing spaces of “interconstitutionality” and putting the traditional role of the national 
constitution at risk.3 Human rights protection is no longer an exclusive responsibility of 
each state.4 It is now “porous” and encourages interjurisditional dialogue.5 
Most international and European human rights legislation – such as the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights – was inspired on common constitutional traditions of 
their Member States.6  This kind of constitutional (global, regional and national) osmosis 
 
2 C. S. Botelho, Os Direitos Sociais em Tempos de Crise – Ou Revisitar as Normas Programáticas, 
Almedina, 2015, p. 80.  
3 F. Balaguer Callejón, “El final de una época dorada. Una reflexión sobre la crisis económica y el declive 
del Derecho Constitucional nacional”, Estudos em Homenagem ao Prof. Doutor José Joaquim Gomes 
Canotilho, vol. II, Coimbra Editora, 2012, pp. 99-121, p. 105, F. L. Pires, Introdução ao Direito 
Constitucional Europeu, Almedina, 1997, p. 18, and P. C. Rangel, “Tranconstitucionalismo versus 
interconstitucionalidade – Uma leitura crítica do pensamento ‘transconstitucional’ de Marcelo Neves”, 
Tribunal Constitucional – 35.º Aniversário da Constituição de 1976, vol. II, Coimbra Editora, 2012, pp. 
151-174, p. 157.  
4 P. Häberle, Verfassungsvergleichung in europa-und weltbürgerlicher Absicht – Späte Schriften, Duncker 
& Humblot, Berlin, 2009, p. 41, and R. Medeiros, A Constituição Portuguesa num contexto global, 
Universidade Católica Editora, Lisboa, 2015, pp. 360-365.      
5 N. Walker, “The migration of constitutional ideas and the migration of the constitutional idea: the case of 
the EU”, The Migration of Constitutional Ideas, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 316-343, p. 317, 
N. Matz-Lück, “Europäische Rechtsakte und nationaler Grundrechtsschutz”, Grundrechte und 
Grundfreiheiten im Mehrebensystem – Konkurrenzen und Interferenzen, Springer, 2012, pp. 161-201, pp. 
188-192, and R. Geesmann, Soziale Grundrechte im deutschen und französischen Verfassunsgrecht und 
der Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union – Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung zu den 
Wirkdimensionen sozialer Grundrechte, Peter Lang, 2005, pp. 118-120, p. 273. 
6 A.-T. Hupka, Der Konventsentwurf für einen Vertrag über eine Verfassung für Europa – Eine britische 
Sicht, Duncker & Humblot, 2010, p. 23, C. S. Botelho, “A recepção da Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da 
União Europeia na ordem jurídico-constitucional portuguesa: uma dinâmica pro unione ou pro 
constitutione?”, Liber Amicorum em homenagem ao Professor Doutor João Mota de Campos, Coimbra 
Editora, 2013, pp. 315-359, pp. 321-326, C. Tomuschat, “Der Verfassungsstaat im Geflecht der 
internationalen Beziehungen”, Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, 36, 
1978, pp. 7-64, p. 50, G. Biaggini, “Die Idee der Verfassung – Neuausrichtung im Zeitalter der 
Globalisierung?”, Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht, 119, 2000, pp. 445-476, p. 454, nt. 25, P. Häberle, 
Europäische Verfassungslehre, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2011, p. 209, and U. Haltern, “Internationales 
Verfassungsrechts?”, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, 128, 2003, pp. 511-557.     
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reveals that “there is no apartheid” between national constitutionalism and European 
constitutionalism.7  
Article 6, § 3 TUE clearly proclaims that “fundamental rights, as guaranteed by 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall 
constitute general principles of the Union’s law.” J. J. Gomes Canotilho and Mariana 
Canotilho were undoubtedly right when they wrote that the appeal to common 
constitutional traditions “permits overcoming the a rigid approach of a ‘lower common 
denominator’ and allows the densification of the European standard of fundamentality so 
as to provide a high level of rights’ protection, adequate to EU law and in accordance 
with the constitutional law of the Member States”.8 
Initially, European constitutionalism struggled with the resistance towards EU 
law, with some constitutional courts trying to shield their constitutions from EU 
supremacy. The expression “constitutional patriotism” (Verfassungspatriotismus) was 
baptized by Dolf Sternberger, in 1979. Some classical examples were the conservative 
jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court,9 the “counter-limits” (contro-limiti) 
theory of the Italian Constitutional Court10, and the more recent Taricco saga.  
Even so, the European resistance led by the Italian Constitutional Court started 
with less intensity as the German. In Taricco I,11 the focus was not a patriotic “identity-
based language” against EU constitutional integration, but “the protection of the 
untouchable core of the constitutional legal order” which somehow unveils Europe’s 
common constitutional heritage.12 However, in Taricco II,13 the ‘constitutional tradition’ 
 
7 V. Moreira, “Constitucionalismo supranacional: a União Europeia depois do Tratado de Lisboa”, Estudos 
em Homenagem ao Prof. Doutor José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, vol. II, cit., pp. 503-539, p. 536.  
8 J. J. G. Canotilho and M. Canotilho, “Artigo 6”, Tratado de Lisboa – Anotado e Comentado (ed. M. L. 
Porto & G. Anastácio), Almedina, Coimbra, 2012, pp. 39-42, p. 42.  
9 The German Constitutional Court presented a list of core state powers immune to the influence of EU law 
(BVerfG, judgment 2 BvE 2/08; or BVerfG, judgment 2 BvR 2728/13).  
10 See Italian Constitutional Court, Judgment 183/1973. The idea of the counter-limits is that supranational 
norms violating the main principles of the Italian Constitution were not applicable in the Italian legal 
system. For an overview, see M. Cartabia, Principi Inviolabili e Integrazione Europea, Giuffrè, Lina, 1995. 
However, as F. Fabbrini and O. Pollicino, “Constitutional Identity in Italy: Institutional Disagreements at 
a Time of Political Change”, Constitutional Identity in a Europe of Multilevel Constitutionalism (C. Calliess 
and G. v. d. Schyff), forthcoming 2019, highlight, “while the CC had recognised the theoretical existence 
of counter-limits to the supremacy of EU law, it clarified that such limits would be mostly hypothetical 
[Italian Constitutional Court, judgment 232/1989], and never invoked them in practice.” 
11 C-105/14, 08.09.2015.  
12 F. Fabbrini and O. Pollicino, “Constitutional Identity in Italy… cit., ibidem.  
13 C-42/17, 05.12.2017. 
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narrative switched to a ‘constitutional identity’/sovereigntist reading of the 
Constitution.14  
If the primacy of European Union law needed strong affirmation during the first 
conflictive decades15, nowadays we should not interpret it in an absolute tone.16 As I have 
written elsewhere: “(i) the Portuguese Constitution conveys to harmonize EU primacy 
with the protection of national identity, since the “fundamental principles of a democratic 
state based on the rule of law” are excepted from the principle of primacy; (ii) if, in some 
cases, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has strongly affirmed primacy,17 in other cases 
it has also shown some plasticity in the understanding of primacy, choosing to assign 
application priority to the national norm, when it guarantees a higher level of protection;18 
(iii) the static language of primacy and verticality has been replaced by a logic of 
cooperation based on horizontality – the interesting concepts of ‘multilevel cooperation’, 
‘model of articulation’ and ‘mutual learning’ have been suggested for this purpose.”19 
In situations where the margin of national appreciation is narrower, the ECJ has 
been stricter in what regards the principle of EU primacy (cases of Melloni20 or Taricco 
I). Yet, in situations where the state had wider discretion, the ECJ has reasoned according 
to the idea of the maximum level of protection (case of Taricco II).21  
 
14 See A. Ruggeri, “Rapporti interordinamentali e conflitti tra identità costituzionali (traendo spunto dal 
caso Taricco)”, Diritto penale contemporaneo, 2017, pp. 115-127, and F. Fabbrini and O. Pollicino, 
“Constitutional Identity in Italy… cit., ibidem.  
15 See ECJ Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, no. 11/70, 17.12.1970, para. 3.  
16 A. von Bogdandy and S. Schill, “Overcoming absolute primacy: respect for national identity under 
Lisbon Treaty”, Common Market Law Review, 48, 2011, pp. 1417-1453, p. 1419, and C. S. Botelho, “A 
recepção da Carta… cit., p. 340.  
17 Such as in cases C-144/04, Mangold (2005), C-399/09, Landtová (2009), and C-173/09, Elchinov (2010). 
18 See cases C-27/00 e C-122/00, Omega (2002), C-112/00, Schmidberger (2003), C-402/05P and C-
415/05P, Kadi and Al Barakaat (2008), and C-62/14, Gauweiler (2015). 
19 C. S. Botelho, “Novo ou velho direito? – O direito ao esquecimento e o princípio da proporcionalidade 
no constitucionalismo global”, Revista AB INSTANTIA, 7, 2018, pp. 49-71, pp. 59-60. More generally, see 
B.-O. Bryde, “The ECJ’s fundamental rights jurisprudence – a milestone in transnational 
constitutionalism”,  The Past and the Future of EU Law – The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th 
Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (ed. M. Poiares Maduro e L. Azulai), Hart Publishing, 2010, pp. 119-129, 
pp. 126-128, F. Schimmelfennig, “Competition and community: constitutional courts, rhetorical action, and 
the institutionalization of human rights in the European Union”, Journal of European Public Policy, 13, 
2006, pp. 1247-1264, p. 1252, G. L. Neuman, “Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and 
Dissonance”, Stanford Law Review, 55 (5), 2003, pp. 1863-1900, pp. 1863-1864, G. Ziegehorn, Der 
Einfluss der EMRK im Recht der EU-Grundrechtecharta – Genuin chartarechtlicher Grundrechtsschutz 
gemäβ Art. 52 Abs. 3 GRCh, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2009, pp. 221-226, M. Delmas-Marty, Towards 
a Truly Common Law: Europe as a Laboratory for Legal Pluralism, Cambridge University Press, 2002, 
M. P. Maduro, “The Double Life of the Charter of Fundamental Rights”, Economic and Social Rights Under 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Hart Publishing, 2003, pp. 269-299, p. 296, and V. C. Jackson, 
“Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement”, Harvard Law Review, 119, 2005, 
pp. 109-128.  
20 C-399/11, 26.02.2013.  
21 For a critique, see M. Bassini and O. Pollicino, Defusing the Taricco Bomb through Fostering 
Constitutional Tolerance: All Roads Lead to Rome, 5 December 2017, Verfassungsblog: 
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Although the EU lacks a formal constitutional text, it surely possesses a material 
constitution. To Miguel Poiares Maduro, the best attempt to theorize European 
constitutionalism was through constitutional pluralism (rule of law, protection of 
minorities, fundamental right’s guarantees).22 In our current transitional period towards 
(what we hope to be) an increasing European constitutional integration, the appeal to the 
Member States’ constitutional traditions is understandable and can be perceived as an 
attempt to “reconcile the irreconcilable”.23  
Hence, the idea of non-negotiable constitutional essentials, instead of creating 
systemic contradictions, can enhance the dialogue on material European integration.24 
European Constitutional Law also includes “various constitutional spaces living side by 
side in the European space”.25 ‘Constitutional traditions’ should be taken into 
consideration, the same way the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) balances 
national singularities with human right’s universalism through the margin of appreciation 
doctrine.26 
What are the ‘common constitutional traditions’ enshrined in the dialogical 
relation between national constitutions and EU treaties? We can think of some: The 
repudiation of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes; the acceptance of a constitutional 
order beyond the nation-state; achievements of freedom, democracy, and peace; and the 
dignity of the human person.27 
 
1.2. National constitutional ‘identity’ or national constitutional ‘tradition’?  
Ten years after the entry into force of the “identity clause”, densified by the Lisbon 




22 M. P. Maduro, “Constitutional Pluralism as the Theory of European Constitutionalism”, Estudos em 
Homenagem ao Prof. Doutor José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, III, cit., pp. 449-471, p. 450.  
23 A. Levade, “Identité constitutionnelle et exigence existentielle, comment concilier l’inconciliable”, 
L’Union européenne: Union de droit, union des droits – Mélanges en l’honneur de Philippe Manin (eds. 
C. Boutayeb, J.-C. Masclet, S. Rodrigues & H. Ruiz Fabri), Pedone, Paris, 2010, pp. 109-128.  
24 Similarly, A. Schillaci, “Caminos de la integración material: la comunitarización de los contralímites en 
la Decisión Sociéte Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine del Conseil d’Etat”, Revista de Derecho Constitucional 
Europeo, 8, 2007, pp. 323-352.  
25 F. Balaguer Callejón, “The dialectic relation between the national and the European constitutional 
identity in the framework of European Constitutional Law”, UNIO – EU Law Journal, 3 (1), 2017, pp 10-
24, p. 12.  
26 C. S. Botelho, “Quo vadis ‘doutrina da margem nacional de apreciação’? O amparo internacional dos 
direitos do homem face à universalização da justiça constitucional”, Estudos Dedicados ao Professor 
Doutor Luís Alberto Carvalho Fernandes, I, Universidade Católica Editora, Lisboa, 2011, pp. 341-376.   
27 For the dignity of the human person, see Case C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-09609. 
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following: “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as 
well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government.”  
The principle of the respect of the national identities of Member States conveys 
that European political integration cannot annihilate national state’ minimum core of 
political and constitutional self-determination.28 My point is that, whatever the scholarly 
stance adopted, ‘national identity’ should be understood as a cluster-concept that 
assembles a myriad of identities, such as cultural, linguistic and social identities or 
political, or economic ones.29  
To some doctrine, ‘constitutional identity’ and ‘national identity’ are not 
overlapping concepts.30 Elke Cloots admits there may be “considerable overlap between 
a Member State’s constitutional identity and its national identity as reflected in its 
fundamental structures”; however, she believes it would be “misguided to simply equate 
the predicate of the EU Treaty’s identity clause with ‘constitutional identity’”.31 To 
Anna Śledzińska-Simon, constitutional identity may intersect with national identity, 
“even though the former does not need a nation for its existence, nor does the latter need 
a state.”32  
Article 4, § 2 expressly addresses Member States’ national identities. However,  
the 2009 Lisbon Treaty seems to have encouraged not only the ECJ,33 but also states’ 
constitutional courts to interpret it in the more restricted sovereignty-based ‘constitutional 
identity’.34 In other words, constitutional identity is being resorted to outline the relations 
between national and supranational legal orders.35 
As Fabbrini and Pollicino astutely point out, what divides ‘constitutional tradition’ 
and ‘constitutional identity’ is “not only a formal, linguistic, difference, but a substantive 
 
28 V. Moreira, “A CRP e a União Europeia”, Estudos em Homenagem ao Conselheiro Presidente Rui Moura 
Ramos, Almedina, Coimbra, vol. I, 2016, pp. 869-926, p. 884.  
29 Accordingly, F. de Quadros, “Artigo 4”, Tratado de Lisboa – Anotado e Comentado, cit., pp. 33-35, p. 
35.  
30 E. Cloots, “National Identity, Constitutional Identity, and Sovereignty in the EU”, Netherlands Journal 
of Legal Philosophy, 45 (2), 2016, pp. 82-98. With a different approach, F. Balaguer Callejón, “The 
dialectic relation… cit., p. 15.  
31 E. Cloots, “National Identity, Constitutional Identity… cit., pp. 82-98, p. 93.  
32 A. Śledzińska-Simon, “Constitutional identity in 3D: A model of individual, relational, and collective 
self and its application in Poland”, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 13 (1), 2015, pp. 124-155,  
p. 127.  
33 Specifically, see case C-53/04, Marrosu and Sardino, Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, § 40; case C-
399/11, Melloni, Opinion of AG Bot, § 137-8 and 142; and case C-62/14, Gauweiler, Opinion of AG Cruz 
Villalón, § 59. 
34 See the examples given in E. Cloots, “National Identity, Constitutional Identity… cit., pp. 82-98, p. 84.  
35 F. Fabbrini and O. Pollicino, “Constitutional Identity in Italy… cit., ibidem.  
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one” (…) The notion of constitutional tradition is by definition pluralistic in nature, 
whereas the reference to constitutional identity, by design, is not.36 In fact, if 
‘constitutional identity’ appeals to a “constitutional-patriotic-based language”, 
‘constitutional traditions’ – “pluralistic and tolerant by design” – is in tune with “the 
current season of cooperative constitutionalism in Europe.”37 
‘Constitutional identity’ is a legal concept open to many interpretations.38 The 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) endeavoured to clarify it, without success.39 In other 
situations, the ECJ has plainly avoided the subject, preferring other routes of 
argumentation.40  
Does ‘constitutional identity’ mean the specific constitutional traits of each state, 
such as having a written or unwritten constitution, being a republic or a monarchy,41 the 
system of government, the protection of a State’s official national language,42 and the 
extension of the right’s catalogue? Or does it have something to do with the cultural 
context in which a constitution operates?   
Michel Troper explains constitutional identity as a set of essential principles that 
protect constitutional integrity.43 To Francisco Balaguer Callejón constitutional identity 
is “linked to other national sovereignty concepts such as the primary constituent power, 
material limits and constitutional revision power”, which hinder the process of 
supranational integration.44 Laurence Tribe very interestingly captures the sociological 
and undefined nature of this concept, when he writes that constitutional identity “cannot 
be objectively deduced or passively discerned in a view-point neutral way”.45  
 
36 Idem, ibidem. 
37 Idem, ibidem. See also Federico Fabbrini and András Sajó, “The dangers of constitutional identity”, 
European Law Journal, 2019, forthcoming.  
38 M. Rosenfeld, “Constitutional Identity”, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (ed. 
M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajó), Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 756-776.   
39 Case 4/73, J Nold KG v EC Commission, [1974] ECR 491, 507.  
40 In case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein, 22.12.2010, paragraphs 83 and 92, in question was the Austrian 
legislation that prohibits aristocratic titles. Although the ECJ recognized that this was part of Austria’s 
constitutional identity, instead of addressing the identity clause, the case was sorted out through the 
application of the proportionality principle.  
41 Sayn-Wittgenstein, § 92. 
42 Case C–391/09, Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn, § 86. 
43 M. Troper, “Behind the Constitution? The Principle of Constitutional Identity in France”, Constitutional 
Topography: Values and Constitutions (ed. A. Sajó and R. Uitz), Eleven International Pub., Portland, 2010, 
p. 202-  
44 F. Balaguer Callejón, “The dialectic relation… cit., p. 21. 
45 L. Tribe, “A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Retrained Judicial Role”, Harvard Law 
Review, 97 (2), 1983, pp. 433-445, p. 440.   
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For Gary J. Jacobsohn, constitutional identity is an armour against “constitutional 
disharmony”.46 In a wider perspective, Michel Rosenfeld projects constitutional identity 
as a response to “dialectical mediation of existing, evolving, and projected conflicts and 
tensions between identity and difference.”47 With this in mind, Rosenfeld advises the EU 
adjudicator to “seek commonalities among the constitutions of member states, thus 
focusing on similarities and analogies across national constitutions.”48 Accordingly, 
Anna Śledzińska-Simon concludes that constitutional identity may disclose “at least three 
dimensions of the self – the individual self, the relational self, and the collective self, 
which constantly interact with each other.”49 
As a given constitutional identity is fluid, it can never be fully acknowledged in 
the present time. In some sense, it is always partially revealed, and it can evolve. Since 
‘constitutional identity’ captures the “core or fundamental elements or values of a 
particular member state’s constitutional order”50 or ‘the individuality or essence of an 
order”51, we wonder: Is ‘constitutional identity’ a constitution inside the constitution and, 
therefore, immune to change?  
 
1.3. The Portuguese Constitution  
The Portuguese constitutional history can be summarized as such: constitutional 
distress in the 19th century, followed by republican experience and long dictatorship in 
the 20th century, transition to democracy in the 70s, with decades of democratic 
consolidation so far.52  
The Portuguese Constitution (1976) is now 43 years old and received many 
foreign influences.53 The German Grundgesetz (1949) and the Italian Constitution (1947) 
clearly influenced its fundamental rights protection. The impressive extent of the social 
rights catalogue and economic constitution were inherited from the ex-Soviet Union 
 
46 G. J. Jacobsohn, Constitutional Identity, Harvard University Press, 2010, pp. 87-88.  
47 M. Rosenfeld, “Constitutional Identity”, cit., pp. 756-776, p. 762.  
48 Idem, p. 772.  
49 A. Śledzińska-Simon, “Constitutional identity in 3D… cit., p. 128.  
50 F. Fabbrini and O. Pollicino, “Constitutional Identity in Italy… cit., ibidem.  
51 G. van der Schyff, “EU Member State constitutional identity: a comparison of Germany and the 
Netherlands as polar opposites”, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 76, 2016, 
pp. 167-190, p. 169. 
52 C. S. Botelho, “Constitutional narcissism on the couch of psychoanalysis… cit., pp. 368-369.  
53 C. S. Botelho, “Is there a middle ground between constitutional patriotism and constitutional 
cosmopolitanism? The Portuguese Constitutional Court and the use of foreign (case) law” in Giuseppe 
Franco Ferrari (Ed.), Judicial Cosmopolitanism – The Use of Foreign Law in Contemporary Constitutional 
Systems, Brill, 2019, pp. 424-448, pp. 425-426.  
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constitutionalism. The semi-presidential system of government was inspired in the French 
constitutionalism, and the “Provedor de Justiça” (Ombudsperson) has a clear inspiration 
in the Nordic constitutional systems.   
The Portuguese Constitutional Court (PCC), created in 1982, is at the top of the 
constitutional hierarchy. Regarding the PCC competences, it is relevant to underline that 
the Court belongs to the European constitutional court’s “family”, such as the courts 
located in Karlsruhe, Rome, Madrid or Zagreb.54 As I will try to explain in the following 
pages, the Portuguese model is a clear vertical model of judicial justice, with a 
constitutional court at the top of the hierarchy of norm constitutionality, albeit having 
some horizontal characteristics, since all the courts have the power not to apply a rule 
they deem unconstitutional. Therefore, as the PCC has no constitutional review 
monopoly, ordinary courts are also “agents of constitutional justice”.55  
 Spanish scholar Francisco Balaguer Callejón points out that the Portuguese 
example can illuminate the debate on the concept of ‘constitutional identity’.56 Although 
the first two amendments of the Portuguese Constitution (in 1982 and 1989) performed 
drastic changes, the majority of the doctrine argues that its ‘constitutional identity’ (such 
as the rule of law, democracy, and the solidarity principle) did not change.57  
To me, though, one should at least ponder whether those constitutional 
amendments operated a “constitutional dismemberment”. According to Richard Albert, a  
“constitutional dismemberment” is a deliberate effort to transform “the identity, the 
fundamental values or the architecture” of the constitution “without breaking legal 
continuity.”58 I find it hard to accept that the Constitution has remained the same, for three 
reasons: (i) the original version of the Portuguese Constitution had such a heavy 
ideological weight of Marxist-Leninist content, that, if not changed, could have 
commuted into left-wing authoritarianism59; (ii) “the brave steps towards ideological and 
 
54 P. Häberle, Verfassungsvergleichung in europa-und weltbürgerlicher Absicht… cit., pp. 61-62.  
55 J. Mendes-Constante, “Les principes constitutionnels et l’organisation juridictionnelle – L’exemple du 
Portugal, Cahiers du Conseil Constitutionnel, 14, 2003, pp. 97-ff, p. 99 (2003). See also G. A. Ribeiro, 
“Judicial Review of Legislation in Portugal: A Brief Genealogy”, Constitutional History: Comparative 
Perspectives (ed. Francesco Biag, Justin O. Frosini and Jason Mazzone), 2019, forthcoming, on file with 
the author). 
56 F. Balaguer Callejón, “The dialectic relation… cit., p. 21.  
57 See J. Miranda, “A originalidade e as principais características da Constituição Portuguesa”, Cuestiones 
Constitucionales, 16, 2007, pp. 253-280, p. 278, and J. J. G. Canotilho, Direito Constitucional e Teoria da 
Constituição, Almedina, Coimbra, 1998, p. 203.  
58 R. Albert, “Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment”, Yale Journal of International Law, 43 (1), 
2018, pp. 1-84 
59 C. S. Botelho, “Aspirational constitutionalism, social rights prolixity and judicial activism: trilogy or 
trinity?”, Comparative Constitutional Law and Administrative Law Quarterly, 3 (4), 2017, pp. 62-87, p. 
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political neutralization of the constitutional amendments of 1982 and 1989 reshaped the 
Portuguese Constitution and made it consonant with the substantive requirements of a 
truly democratic Rule of Law”60; (iii) and, as PCC Justice Gonçalo Almeida Ribeiro 
wrote, “it is a romantic misconception to assume the perfect democratic genesis of the 
Portuguese constitutional system.”61 The PCC was created in 1982, replacing the 
“Council of revolution”, a military organ with powers of constitutional review.62 
Even if the original version of the Portuguese constitution (1976) contemplated a 
notorious eternity/entrenchment clause (former article 290), the truth is that “some of 
these provisions were indeed modified or removed in the 1989 constitutional amendment 
process. This occurred without major disagreement from the political organs, scholars or 
the judiciary.”63 To Balaguer Callejón, this example reveals that “it is precisely the 
pluralist democracy that may be essentially identified with the constitutional identity and 
contrarily to concrete contents of the legal-constitutional system”, that can be changed 
through constitutional amendment.64 
The Portuguese constitution suffers from a dysfunctionality I labelled 
“constitutional narcissism”.65 The narcissism of the Portuguese foundational moment 
meant a substantial divorce from the past and triggered the ideological compromise of 
transitioning to a classless society. The Portuguese Constitution of 1976, being one of the 
last postmodern revolutionary Constitutions (a destruens followed by a construens), is a 
defensive text, with singularities that set it apart from the rest of the European 
 
65, J. C. da Costa, “Tribunal Constitucional e debate público”, 40 Anos de Políticas de Justiça em Portugal, 
Almedina, Coimbra, 2016, pp. 113-141, p. 120, and J. Miranda, Da Revolução à Constituição – Memórias 
da Assembleia Constituinte, Principia, 2015, pp. 181-272.   
60 C. S. Botelho, “Constitutional narcissism on the couch of psychoanalysis… cit., p. 360. See also L.P.P. 
Coutinho, A Autoridade Moral da Constituição – Da Fundamentação da Validade do Direito 
Constitucional, Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, 2009, pp. 429-450, and M. L. Amaral, “Problemas da Judicial 
Review em Portugal”, Themis, VI, 2005, pp. 67-90, p. 88. 
61 G. A. Ribeiro, “O paradoxo democrático na constituição portuguesa de 1976”, Estudos em Homenagem 
ao Presidente Rui Moura Ramos (eds. M.L. Amaral & S.P. Bettencourt), Coimbra, Almedina, 2016, pp. 
121-148, p. 138.  
62 A. R. Mendes, “O Conselho da Revolução e a Comissão Constitucional na fiscalização da 
constitucionalidade das leis: 1976-1983”, Portugal: O Sistema Político e Constitucional 1974-1987, 
Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 1989, pp. 925-940, K. Maxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy, 
Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 109-113, and pp. 158-178, M. L. Amaral and R. A. Pereira, “Um 
tribunal como os outros. Justiça constitucional e interpretação da constituição”, Estudos em Homenagem 
ao Conselheiro Presidente Rui Moura Ramos, Almedina, Coimbra, 2016, pp. 381-442, pp. 420-422, and 
L. N. de Almeida, “Da politização da justiça à justicialização da política – do Conselho da Revolução ao 
Tribunal Constitucional”, 20 Anos da Constituição de 1976, Coimbra Editora, Coimbra, 2000, pp. 277-289.  
63 C. S. Botelho, “Constitutional narcissism on the couch of psychoanalysis… cit., p. 345.  
64 F. Balaguer Callejón, “The dialectic relation… cit., p. 23.  
65 C. S. Botelho, “Constitutional narcissism on the couch of psychoanalysis: Constitutional unamendability 
in Portugal and Spain”, European Journal of Law Reform, 21 (3), 2019, pp. 346-376.  
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constitutions. Its constitutional defensiveness is revealed by the long unamendable clause 
(article 288), the prolix catalogue of social rights, one of the widest social rights catalogue 
in the world and probably the widest in Europe (articles 58 to 79),66 and the detailed 
economical constitution (articles 80 to 107).67     
As I will address later (II. 2.1.) The PCC has not bluntly stated the supremacy of 
EU law over the Constitution,68 although it has declared that the legislative power must 
respect the obligations derived from EU Law.69 I dare say the PCC is not only “one of the 
most cosmopolitan constitutional courts in the world” 70, open to multilevel judicial 
dialogue, but also a Europe-friendly court.71 With this in mind, Francisco Pereira 
Coutinho and Nuno Piçarra assert that the PCC “seems to follow the generalized 
perception within Portuguese legal doctrine that the core legal values of the Portuguese 
Constitution are shared by the EU legal order and, therefore, it is unlikely that an EU legal 
act will go against the Constitution.”72 
 
1.4. Constitutional tradition in the Portuguese Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence 
There are not explicit references to ‘constitutional tradition’ in the Portuguese 
legal system, nor does it give it a specific legal significance. The Portuguese Constitution 
distinguishes between two kind of norms: principles and rules.73 Human dignity (article 
1), equality (article 13), rule of law and separation and interdependence of powers (article 
2) are principles. Right to life (article 24), freedom of expression and information (article 
37), right to travel and to emigrate (article 44) or the right to vote (article 49) are rules. 
 
66 A. Ben-Bassat and M. Dahan, “Social rights in the constitution and in practice”, Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 36 (1), 2008, pp. 103-119, J. Martinez Soria, “Das Recht auf Sicherung des 
Existenzminimums”, Juristenzeitung, 13, 2005, pp. 647-655, and M. B. Vieira and F. C. da Silva, “Getting 
Rights Right: Explaining social rights constitutionalization in revolutionary Portugal”, International 
Journal of Constitutional Law, 11 (4), 2013, pp. 898-922, pp. 898-899.    
67 C. S. Botelho, “Constitutional narcissism on the couch of psychoanalysis… cit., pp. 369-370.   
68 It has instead referred to the existence of a “multilevel constitutional system” and that article 8, § 4 urges 
obligations that emerge directly from EU law (PCC Ruling no. 575/2014, 15.08.2014, para. 25). 
69 PCC Ruling no. 141/2015, 25.02.2015, para. 7. 
70 C. S. Botelho, “Is there a middle ground between constitutional patriotism and constitutional 
cosmopolitanism?... cit., pp. 447-448.   
71 A. M. G. Martins and M. P. Roque, “Judicial Dialogue in a Multilevel Constitutional Network – The role 
of the Portuguese Constitutional Court”, Courts and Comparative Law (ed. M. Andenas & D. Fairgrieve), 
Oxford Scholarship Online, 2015, pp. 309 ff.  
72 72 F. P. Coutinho and N. Piçarra, “Portugal: The Impact of European Integration and the Economic Crisis 
on the Identity of the Constitution”, A. Albi and S. Bardutzky (eds.), National Constitutions in European 
and Global Governance: Democracy, Rights, the Rule of Law, 2019, pp. 591-639, p. 602.  
73 C. S. Botelho, “O papel dos princípios na interpretação constitucional”, Estudos em Homenagem ao 
Conselheiro Presidente Rui Moura Ramos, Almedina, Coimbra, vol. I, 2016, pp. 59-86, pp. 75-84, and M. 
A. Vaz, Teoria da Constituição – O que é a Constituição, hoje?, Coimbra Editora, Coimbra, 2012, pp. 104-
111. 
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Additionally, the cultural and axiological dimensions add societal values that 
reflect and influence the constitutional text.74 Values can be understood as “transcendent 
limits” to the constituent power and can deem a constitutional norm unconstitutional 
(unconstitutional constitutional norms).75 Some references are made to “values”, such as 
“the preservation of cultural values and assets that are of historic or artistic interest (article 
66, § 2, c)); “respect for environmental values and assets” (article 66, § 2, g)); 
“motherhood and fatherhood constitute eminent social values” (article 68, § 2); and “the 
law may provide for the participation of lay magistrates in judgements (…) that justify 
special consideration of the social values that have been infringed” (article 207, § 2).  
Portugal belongs to the civil law tradition. The legalist tradition does not give 
much room for custom. As Carlos Blanco de Morais refers, “the role of custom as an 
instrument of implicit alteration of constitutional norms is very modest”.76 Furthermore, 
we can argue that, as the Portuguese Constitution is very detailed, customary 
constitutional law has remained underdeveloped.  
Custom is not an immediate source of law. Still, doctrine recognizes the existence 
of custom secundum legem and prater legem, if acknowledged by the constitutional 
jurisdiction.77 Legal scholarship prefer to use the expression “conventions” (usos 
institucionais) to address constitutional praxis that somehow possess constitutional soft 
law status.78 One example is the constitutional praxis that has limited the power of the 
President of the Republic regarding the nomination of the Prime-Minister, on the grounds 
that the government needs parliamentary support in order to get its programme approved 
(articles 187, § 1, and 192 of the Constitution).79  
 
74 M. A. Vaz, Teoria da Constituição… cit., p. 114.  
75 For a general perspective on unconstitutional constitutional norms, see O. Bachof, Verfassungswidrige 
Verfassungsnormen?, J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1951 and Y. Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional 
Amendments – The Limits of Amendment Powers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017. 
76 C. B. Morais, Curso de Direito Constitucional – Teoria da Constituição em Tempo de Crise do Estado 
Social, II, Coimbra Editora, Coimbra, 2014, p. 254.  
77 C. B. Morais, Curso de Direito Constitucional… cit., p. 254, and M. A. Vaz, Teoria da Constituição… 
cit., pp. 113-114.   
78 C. B. Morais, Curso de Direito Constitucional… cit., pp. 254-255.  
79 C. S. Botelho, “Portugal: The State of Liberal Democracy”, in R. Albert, D. Landau, P. Faraguna & S. 
Drugda  (Ed.), 2017 Global Review of Constitutional Law, I.CONnect and the Clough Center for the Study 
of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College, 2018, pp. 230-234: “In the 2015 legislative elections, the 
colligation PàF (Portugal à Frente) – which gathered the centre-right party PSD (Social Democratic Party) 
and the conservative CDS-PP (Popular Party) – won by 39%. However, after being nominated by President 
Cavaco Silva as Government, the colligation PàF was not able to pass its programme within the Parliament. 
A motion of rejection of the Government’s programme was approved by 123 votes, determining its fall 
(articles 194/4 and 195/1/d)). For that reason, this Government was the shortest one in the history of the 
Portuguese constitutional democracy, governing only for twenty-eight days. According to the Constitution, 
the President was doubly limited. In fact, due to him being in the last semester of his term of office, and to 
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The Portuguese system draws a clear distinction between administrative and 
constitutional law, although mutual imbrication is inevitable.80 Portuguese scholars have 
imported Fritz Werner’s assertion of administrative law as “materialized constitutional 
law” (konkretisiertes Verfassungsrecht)81. In fact, Otto Mayer’s maxim of the beginning 
of last century, which declared “constitutional law passes, administrative law remains” 
(Verfassungsrecht vergeht, Verwaltungsrecht besteht) was overtaken by the new demands 
of modern society. Currently and above the legality principle, the principle of 
constitutionality has become the gravitational center of an entire legal order.82 It is 
therefore common to refer to the “administrative constitution” (Werner), although 
regulation is gradually conquering more space.83   
The concept of ‘common constitutional traditions’, endorsed in article 6, § 3 TUE, 
is translated by the PCC as “tradições constitucionais comuns aos Estados-Membros” 
(constitutional traditions that are common to Members States), thus suggesting the 
Europeanization of this subject: A common ground between different European legal 
orders.  
 
the Parliament being in the first semester since its election (article 172/1), he was not able to dissolve the 
Parliament and call an early general election. 
This constitutional impasse lead to a political crisis and the President only had three viable options: 
(i) maintain a caretaker Government, which was not the best solution, since the Government would have 
to “limit itself to undertaking the acts that are strictly necessary in order to ensure the management of public 
affairs” (article 185/6) and therefore, with a low political legitimacy, could not underplay innovative 
legislative acts; (ii) nominate a government of presidential initiative, in a boarder-based firm, with members 
of the three political parties that had signed the Memorandum of Understanding with “Troika”. 
Nevertheless, due to the distressing political crisis, such composition would almost certainly fail again 
when submitting its programme to the Parliament; (iii) nominate a Government of the Socialist Party (which 
was the second most voted party), after two other left-wing parties – the Communists (PCP) and the Left 
Bloc (BE) – clarified that they would bestow their parliamentary support. The President opted for this last 
alternative, believing it could guarantee stability. For the first time since the establishment of democracy, 
PCP and BE supported the party in government.”  
80 See J. Miranda, “Os parâmetros constitucionais da reforma do contencioso administrativo”, Cadernos de 
Justiça Administrativa, 24, 2000, pp. 3-10, p. 3, J. J. G. Canotilho, Direito Constitucional e Teoria da 
Constituição, cit., p. 966, P. C. Rangel, Repensar o Poder Judicial – Fundamentos e Fragmentos, 
Universidade Católica, Porto, 2001, p. 184, and V. P. da Silva, O Contencioso Administrativo como Direito 
Constitucional Concretizado ou Ainda por Concretizar (?), Almedina, Coimbra, 1999, p. 5.  
81 Apud K. Schlaich and S. Korioth, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht – Stellung, Verfahren, Entscheidungen, 
Verlag C. H. Beck, München, 2004, p. 16.  This assumption, however, does not mean that administrative 
law is a mere concretization of constitutional law, without its own scientific autonomy. 
82 C. S. Botelho, A Tutela Directa dos Direitos Fundamentais – Avanços e Recuos na Dinâmica 
Garantística das Justiças Constitucional, Administrativa e Internacional, Almedina, Coimbra, 2010, p. 23.  
83 J. Robert, “Droit administratif et droit constitutionnel”, Revue du Droit Public (et de la Science Politique 
en France et a l’étranger), 4, 1998, pp. 971-978, p. 971.  
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The definition of the “constitutional alma mater”84 or the “identity core” 85 of a 
national constitution is the responsibility of the constitutional jurisdiction of each state,86 
provided that it respects EU law.87 A search into the database of the PCC revealed the 
following results:  
(i) one entry for “identidade constitucional” (constitutional identity)88;  
(ii) seven entries for “identidade nacional” (national identity), although 
filtered to five (as two of them referred to the pleadings), two citing article 
4, § 2 TEU,89 one referring to article 6, § 3 TEU,90 another citing a legal 
diploma,91 and yet another mentioning cultural national heritage;92 
(iii) Ten entries for “tradição constitucional” (constitutional tradition), 
although filtered to eight for the same reason mentioned above: three as 
obiter dicta93 and five referring to legacies of previous Portuguese 
constitutions;94 
(iv) Four entries filtered to three for “tradições constitucionais” (constitutional 
traditions): one referring to the constitutional experiences of other states95, 
and two citing article 6, § 3 TEU96; 
(v)  None for “tradição comum” (common tradition) nor for “tradições 
comuns” (common traditions); 
(vi) Five references for “tradição nacional” (national tradition): one dissenting 
opinion97 and four referring to a legal tradition98;  
(vii)  Zero entries for “tradições nacionais” (national traditions);  
 
84 C. S. Botelho, “Constitutional narcissism on the couch of psychoanalysis… cit., pp. 372-374.  
85 M. L. Duarte, “Sobre o caso Gauweiler… cit., p. 763.  
86 P.-E. Lehmann, Réflexions sur la nature de l’Union Européenne à partir du respect de l’identité nationale 
des États membres, Université de Lorraine, 2013, p. 6, available at: https://hal.univ-lorraine.fr/tel-
01750918/document  
87 F.-X. Millet, L’Union européenne et l’identité constitutionnelle des États membres, LGDJ, Paris, 2013,  
88 PCC Ruling no. 305/2011, 29.06.2011.  
89 PCC Rulings no. 575/2014, 14.08.2014, and no. 574/2014, 14.08.2014.  
90 PCC Ruling no. 345/02, 11.07.2002. 
91 PCC Ruling no. 54/99, 26.01.1999.  
92 PCC Ruling no. 280/90, 23.10.1990.  
93 PCC Rulings no. 64/2005, 02.02.2005, no. 494/99, 05.08.1999, and no. 174/93, 17.02.1993.  
94 PCC Rulings no. 267/88, 29.11.1988, no. 109/88, 01.06.1988, no. 157/85, 31.07.1985, no. 120/84, 
05.12,1984, and no. 49/84, 06.06.1984.  
95 PCC Ruling no. 296/2013, 28.05.2013.  
96 PCC Rulings no. 611/2013, 24.09.2013, and no. 224/2006, 23.03.2006.  
97 PCC Ruling 417/18, 09.08.2018. 
98 PCC Rulings no. 48/99, 19.01.1999, no. 254/98, 05.03.1998, no. 121/97, 19.02.1997, and no. 31/84, 
27.03.1984.  
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(viii) One entry for “património constitucional” (constitutional heritage), 
mentioning the legal judge principle;99 
(ix) And zero entries for “legado constitucional” (constitutional legacy).   
  
 
2. Distinctive traits of Portuguese constitutionalism:  
 
2.1. A unique hybrid constitutional justice system100 
The Portuguese constitutional review model is hybrid, as it shares characteristics 
of the monist/Kelsenian model as also traits of the diffused model of judicial review. The 
American influence is an indirect one. In fact, Article 63 of the first republican Portuguese 
Constitution (1911) was inspired in the Brazilian Constitution (1891), which in turn was 
influenced by the United States Constitution (1787). 
In comparison with the Italian, German and Spanish systems of judicial review, 
the Portuguese system has some unique traits.101 If the first States opted for concentrated 
constitutional justice and to give incidental control mechanisms the form of preliminary 
review, the latter gives judicial review powers to ordinary courts as well. Accordingly, if 
an ordinary judge finds that the norm applicable to a case is unconstitutional, the judge 
does not suspend the process and questions the Constitutional Court. The Portuguese 
ordinary courts can dismiss the norm application in that concrete judicial process, since 
they are under the duty not to apply rules they consider unconstitutional (article 204).102 
Despite having these powers, matters in the ordinary courts can be referred to a court 
outside the ordinary jurisdiction – a Constitutional Court.  
Notwithstanding the appraisal of the original traits of the Portuguese constitutional 
justice model, the truth is that many scholars suggest improvements. One of the deficits 
 
99 PCC Ruling no. 667/99, 14.12.1999.  
100 C. S. Botelho, “Is there a middle ground between constitutional patriotism and constitutional 
cosmopolitanism?... cit., pp. 426-427. 
101 Vide, amongst many references, J. Miranda, “As instituições políticas portuguesas”, La Constitución 
Portuguesa de 1976 – Un estudio académico treinta años después, 2006, pp. 35-ff, p. 41, J. de M. 
Alexandrino, “Il sistema portoghese dei diritti e delle libertà fondamentali: zone franche nella tutela 
giurisdizionale”, Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo, 2003, pp. 271-ff, p. 272, M. L. Amaral, 
“Problemas da Judicial Review em Portugal”, cit., p. 82, and V. Moreira, “A “fiscalização concreta” no 
quadro do sistema misto de justiça constitucional”, Boletim Comemorativo do 75.º Tomo do BFD, 2003, 
pp. 815-ff.  
102 See J. J. G. Canotilho and V. Moreira, A Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, vol. II, 
Coimbra Editora, Coimbra, 2010, pp. 517-523.  
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of protection is the absence of a constitutional complaint mechanism, similar to the 
Spanish “recurso de amparo constitucional” or the German “Verfassungsbeschwerde”.103   
 
2.2. The longest unamendable clause in the world104 
Unamendable clauses (also called entrenchment/eternity clauses) are armors 
against constitutional law’s contingency and portrait a given constitutional identity.105 
They impose substantial limits to constitutional change.  
The Portuguese unamendable clause is so remarkable that it raises the pertinent 
question of its compatibility with a plural and democratic State.106 For the first time in 
Portuguese constitutional history, article 288 (former article 290) establishes several 
substantial limitations to the amendment power.107  
The substantial limits to amendments are the following:  
“a) National independence and unity of the state; b) The republican form of 
government; c) Separation between church and state; d) Citizens’ rights, freedoms 
and guarantees; e) The rights of workers, works councils, and trade unions; f) The 
 
103 A. Vitorino, “A justiça constitucional – Notas sobre o futuro (possível?) da justiça constitucional”, 
Revista do Ministério Público, VI, pp. 9-14, C. S. Botelho, A Tutela Directa dos Direitos Fundamentais, 
cit., pp. 167-284, and “Haja uma Nova Jurisdição Constitucional – Pela introdução de um mecanismo de 
acesso directo dos particulares ao Tribunal Constitucional”, Revista da Ordem dos Advogados, 70, 2011, 
pp. 591-623, J. Miranda, Ideias para uma revisão constitucional em 1996, Cosmos, Lisboa, 1996, p. 29, J. 
R. Novais, “Em Defesa do Recurso de Amparo Constitucional (ou uma Avaliação Crítica do Sistema 
Português de Fiscalização Concreta da Constitucionalidade)”, in Themis, ano VI, 2005, pp. 91-117, J. J. G. 
Canotilho, Estudos Sobre Direitos Fundamentais, Coimbra Editora, Coimbra, 2004, p. 79, J. M. S. Correia 
and J. B. Gouveia, “Princípios constitucionais do acesso à justiça, da legalidade processual e do 
contraditório; junção de pareceres em processo civil; interpretação conforme à Constituição do artigo 525.º 
do Código do Processo Civil – Anotação ao Acórdão n.º 934/96 do Tribunal Constitucional”, Revista da 
Ordem dos Advogados, 57, 1997, pp. 295-357, pp. 301-302, M. A. Vaz,  A Responsabilidade Civil do 
Estado – Considerações breves sobre o seu estatuto constitucional, Universidade Católica Editora, Porto, 
1995, p. 15, nt. 30 and p. 16, nt. 33, M. R. de Sousa and J. de M. Alexandrino, Constituição da República 
Portuguesa – Comentada, Livraria Petrony, Lisboa, 2000, p. 103, M. L. Amaral, “Queixas Constitucionais 
e Recursos de Constitucionalidade (Uma Lição de ‘Direito Público Comparado’)”, Estudos Comemorativos 
dos 10 Anos da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade Nova de Lisboa, vol. I, Almedina, 2008, pp. 473-
501, pp. 496-499, N. Piçarra, O Tribunal de Justiça das Comunidades Europeias como juiz legal e o 
processo do artigo 177.º do Tratado da CEE – As relações entre a ordem jurídica comunitária e as ordens 
jurídicas dos Estados-membros da perspectiva dos tribunais constitucionais, Livraria Petrony, Lisboa, 
1991, pp. 95-96, P. Otero, Ensaio sobre o caso julgado inconstitucional, Lex, Lisboa, 1993, p. 121, and V. 
Moreira “Princípio da maioria e princípio da constitucionalidade: legitimidade e limites da justiça 
constitucional”, Legitimidade e Legitimação da Justiça Constitucional – Colóquio no 10.º Aniversário do 
Tribunal Constitucional, Coimbra Editora, Coimbra, 1995, pp. 177-198, p. 192.  
104 I will follow very closely my considerations in “Constitutional narcissism on the couch of 
psychoanalysis… cit., pp. 363-366.  
105 R. Albert, ‘Constitutional Handcuffs’, Arizona State Law Journal, Vol. 42, 2010, pp. 663-715, p. 700.  
106 See F. L. Pires, Teoria da Constituição de 1976 – A Transição Dualista, Coimbra, 1988, p. 161, and R. 
Medeiros, A Constituição Portuguesa num Contexto Global, cit., p. 213. Peter Suber, in F. Araújo, ‘Limites 
à revisão constitucional – um paradoxo?’, Polis – Revista de Estudos Políticos, 7-8, 1999, pp. 95-99, 
referred to this norm as “a distressing naivety” of the Portuguese constituent power.  
107 In the Portuguese constitutional history, only the republican constitution of 1911 established an 
entrenchment clause, which was the “republican form of government”.  
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coexistence between the public, private, and cooperative, and social sectors of 
ownership of the means of production; g) The existence of economic plans, within 
the framework of a mixed economy; h) The appointment of the elected officeholders 
of the entities that exercise sovereignty, of the organs of the autonomous regions 
and of local government organs by universal, direct, secret and periodic suffrage, 
and the proportional representation system; i) Plural expression and political 
organisation, including political parties, and the right of democratic opposition; j) 
The separation and interdependence of the entities that exercise sovereignty; l) The 
subjection of legal norms to review of their positive constitutionality and of their 
unconstitutionality by omission; m) The independence of the courts; n) The 
autonomy of local authorities; o) The political and administrative autonomy of the 
Azores’ and Madeira’s archipelagos”108.    
Material limits can be implicit as well. Scholars have identified some implicit 
limitations, such as: the protection of territorial integrity (inferred from the unity of the 
State)109, the principle of irresponsibility of judges (derived from the principle of judicial 
independence and impartiality), and the prohibition of lifelong mandates (resulting from 
the democratic principle). 110  
The current version of the Portuguese Constitution contains 14 clauses of 
entrenchment, as some were removed or altered in the constitutional amendment of 1989. 
Therefore, “it is quite clear that the unchangeable clause was indeed changed. The 
collapse of communism and the political changes of the 90s asked for a renewed 
understanding of what a constitution should be: not a government’s programme, not a 
semantic constitution, but an open constitution. As the constitutional praxis did not take 
these limits into consideration, they became obsolete norms.”111  
The Portuguese Constitution does not seem to allow a simultaneous double 
revision, which is the synchronized amendment of the entrenchment clause and of the 
 
108 This provision was approved by a significant majority, since only 5 parliament members of the 
conservative CDS-PP (Popular Party) voted against it. 
109 O. Doyle, “Constraints on Constitutional Amendment Powers”, The Foundations and Traditions of 
Constitutional Amendment (eds. R. Albert, X. Contiades, & A. Fotiadou), Portland, Hart Publishing, 2017, 
pp. 73-95, p. 94. Y. Roznai and S. Suteu, “The Eternal Territory? The Crimean Crisis and Ukraine’s 
Territorial Integrity as an Unamendable Constitutional Principle”, German Law Journal, 16, 2015, pp. 542-
580, p. 573, believe that the alteration of a polity such as territoriality should be done through existing 
constitutional processes.  
110 J. E. M. Machado, “The Portuguese Constitution of 1976”, Engineering Constitutional Change – A 
Comparative Perspective on Europe, Canada and USA (ed. X. Contiades), Routledge, 2013, pp. 273-298, 
p. 283.  
111 C. S. Botelho, “Constitutional narcissism on the couch of psychoanalysis… cit., pp. 363-264. See R. 
Albert, “Constitutional Amendment by Constitutional Desuetude”, American Journal of Comparative Law, 
62 (3), 2014, pp. 641-686. Another interesting perspective is the idea of “constitutional atrophy”. See A. 
Vermeule, “The Atrophy of Constitutional Powers”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 32 (3), pp. 421-444. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3688308




principles and articles related to that limit.112 However, the 1989 amendment did operate 
a synchronized amendment, eliminating former paragraph j) from the substantial limits 
list.113 Simultaneously, article 81 of the Constitution was modified regarding 
“nationalizations” and “rural estate property”, while other significant changes were 
introduced in the economic Constitution, concerning the “structure of the means of 
production”.  
 
2.3. The economic constitution  
One of the most interesting features of the Portuguese Constitution is the relevance 
given to economic, social and cultural rights. Notwithstanding the incompleteness of the 
sociological split between functional and aspirational conceptions of constitutionalism,  
the Portuguese constitution fits well in the latter. Aspirational constitutionalism embodies 
the following traits: a prolix and exhaustive constitutional text; a wide catalogue of 
fundamental rights; and the very generous granting of social constitutional rights, even 
beyond the budgetary possibilities of the State114. Such constitutional arsenal is 
sometimes difficult to interpret and to implement. Therefore, questions rise regarding the 
dilution of borders between judicial and legislative power.115 
The wishful thinking of the Portuguese constitutional framers is well documented. 
Many foreign authors considered this baroque text an inconsistent compromise between 
liberalism and socialism, or a “project for building a future”.116  Portuguese economic 
constitution was inspired in the Constitution of the Republic of Weimar (1919) and the 
philosophies of “economic democracy” (Wirtschaftsdemokratie) and “social market 
economy” (soziale Marktwirtschaft).117  
 
112 C. S. Botelho, “Constitutional narcissism on the couch of psychoanalysis… cit., p. 363.  
113 Paragraph j) stated “the participation of grass-roots popular committees in the local government”. The 
former version of paragraph f) entrenched “the principle of collective appropriation of the means of 
production, of the soil, and of natural resources” and “the prohibition of monopolies and large rural estates” 
(currently paragraph f) has a softer tone: “the coexistence of the public, private and cooperative and social 
sectors of ownership of the means of production”). Former paragraph g) entrenched the “principle of 
democratic central planning of the economy” (now: “economic plans” “within the framework of a mixed 
economy”).  
114 C. S. Botelho, Os direitos sociais em tempos de crise… cit., pp. 167-164.   
115 C. S. Botelho, “Aspirational constitutionalism, social rights prolixity… cit., pp. 76-84.   
116 O. de Carvalho, “The Constitution of the Republic of Portugal and the ownership of the means of 
production”, Boletim da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Coimbra, 1981, pp. 223-229, p. 223.  
117 See A. Batista, “As constituições económicas portuguesa e espanhola em perspectiva comparada: 
transição democrática e abertura relativa dos sistemas económicos ibéricos”, O Direito, IV, 2012, pp. 909-
950, and P. A. Pardal, “O acidental percurso da constituição económica portuguesa”, Revista de 
Concorrência e Regulação, 22, 2015, pp. 17-53, pp. 20-21. 
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One must highlight, though, that, during the monarchic constitutions (1822, 1826, 
and 1838) and the first republican constitutional experience (1911) a kind of “implicit 
economic constitutionalism” occurred: minimum state and maximum individual 
freedoms (economic liberalism).118 The authoritarian Constitution of 1933 was the first 
Portuguese constitution ever to implement an economic and social order – corporatism – 
being, thus, the first formal economic constitution.119  
The current Portuguese Constitution (1976), implemented after the transition to 
democracy, tried to implement a socialist economic constitution, which gathered legal, 
philosophical and economic principles envisioned for transitioning to a classless 
society.120 Revolutionary socialism and collectivism meant economic change through: (i) 
collective appropriation of the main means of production; (ii) democratic economic 
planning; (iii) and the exercise of democratic power by working people.121 The 
Constitution recognized three major sectors of ownership: the public sector (which should 
be the dominant one); the cooperative sector; and the private sector.  
Constitutional amendments of 1982 and 1989 were of paramount importance, as 
they revisited the economic constitution, eliminated many of its norms, and neutralized 
the main socializing traits.122Additionally, after the Portuguese adhesion to the (then) 
European Communities, in 1985, and the Maastricht Treaty, in 1992, the economic 
constitution shifted very clearly to a market economy and to a regulatory state. The 
current economic constitution (articles 80 to 107) is, beyond a doubt, surpassed by the 
European economic constitution.123  
Hence, some doctrine considers that the Portuguese economic constitution needs 
further amendments which can truly reflect the European integration.124 More 
vehemently, Paulo Otero considers that the economic constitution should be fully 
interpreted in conformity with EU law, even if that means the “marginalization or 
 
118 M. A. Vaz, Direito Económico, Coimbra Editora, Coimbra, 4.ª ed., 1998, pp. 51-52.    
119 P. A. Pardal, “O acidental percurso da constituição económica portuguesa”, cit., p. 25.  
120 The constitutional text had norms such as: “the Portuguese Republic is a Democratic State (…) with the 
goal of assuring the transition to socialism through the creation of conditions for the exercise of power by 
the working classes” (article 2); “the law can regulate that the expropriation of landowners, owners and 
entrepreneurs or shareholders does not give rise to any compensation” (article 82); “all nationalizations 
(…) are irreversible conquests of the working classes” (article 83). 
121 O. de Carvalho, “The Constitution of the Republic of Portugal… cit., p. 224.  
122 C. S. Botelho, “Aspirational constitutionalism, social rights prolixity and judicial activism… cit., p. 66. 
123 M. A. Vaz and M. F. Campos, “Anotação ao artigo 80.º”, Constituição Portuguesa Anotada (ed. J. 
Miranda & R. Medeiros), vol. II, Universidade Católica Editora, Lisboa, 2018, pp. 13-27.  
124 C C. B. Morais, Curso de Direito Constitucional… cit., p. 260, and F. P. Coutinho and N. Piçarra, 
“Portugal: The Impact of European Integration… cit., p. 600.  
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ignorance of constitutional provisions contrary or barely compatible with certain 
imperatives that stem from EU law.”125 
 
2.4. Perfectionism and prolixity of the fundamental rights catalogue  
Fundamental rights are codified in the Portuguese constitution “with a careful, 
quite perfectionist, systematization which can rarely be found in comparative 
constitutional law”.126 The Fundamental rights catalogue consists of sixty-eight articles. 
With regard to liberty rights, if the Constitution bravely declares that they “bind private 
entities” (article 18, § 1), it then paradoxically abandons them to the ordinary justice, as 
a constitutional complaint mechanism is not consecrated in the Constitution.127  
As I mentioned above, the hope for continuous progress translated in the 
Portuguese constitution having one of the widest social rights catalogues in the world and 
probably the broadest in Europe.  
For example, article 66 consecrates the right to environment and quality of life 
with such density that it places the Portuguese Constitution as a pioneer in environmental 
protection through fundamental rights’ constitutionalization. Echoing this concern, the 
Portuguese constitution influenced the Spanish, Brazilian and Mozambican ones.128 
Besides this, the detailed list of rights, freedoms and guarantees regarding the criminal 
justice system (articles 27 to 32) is quite unusual from a comparative constitutional law 
perspective.129  
 In consonance with the “clear-cut division of the time,”130 the Portuguese 
Constitution rifts fundamental rights in two categories: (i) rights, liberties and freedoms 
 
125 P. Otero, Legalidade e Administração Pública: o sentido da vinculação administrativa à juridicidade, 
Almedina, Coimbra, 2003, p. 549. In a similar sense, V. Moreira, “A CRP e a União Europeia”, cit., p. 905.  
126 J. R. Novais, Direitos Fundamentais e Justiça Constitucional em Estado de Direito Democrático, 
Coimbra Editora, Coimbra, 2012, p. 240.  
127 Idem, p. 289.  
128 M. da G. Garcia and G. Matias, “Anotação ao artigo 66.º”, Constituição Portuguesa Anotada (ed. J. 
Miranda and R. Medeiros), Coimbra Editora, Coimbra, 2010, pp. 1340-1355.  
129 F. P. Coutinho and N. Piçarra, “Portugal: The Impact of European Integration… cit., pp. 606-607.   
130 “This systematic option is the reality of most international legislation approved after the Second World 
War. In 1966, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) were approved. (…) In an international 
regional dimension, there is also a clear division between the European Convention on Human Rights 
(1950) and the European Social Charter (1961). The latter has a very inferior enforceability level when 
compared to the ECHR.” (C. S. Botelho, “Aspirational constitutionalism, social rights prolixity… cit., pp. 
68-69). See also S. Deakin and J. Browne, “Social Rights and Market Order: Adapting the Capability 
Approach”, Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – A Legal 
Perspective (ed. T. K. Hervey & J. Kenner), Hart Publishing, 2003, pp. 27-43, p. 38.  
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(Title II – articles 24 to 57); and (ii) social, economic and cultural rights (Title II – articles 
58 to 79).  
 This division would not be relevant if the constitutional framer did not consecrate 
a special regime for rights, liberties and freedoms (herein liberty rights). Indeed, the 
Portuguese Constitution reserves a special regime to liberty rights.131 This raises the 
question of social rights’ regime. Is it the same as liberty rights? The Portuguese doctrine 
is highly divided in this matter.132 I stand for a renewed understanding of social rights, 
grounded in material indivisibility and structural interaction between liberty rights and 
social rights.133  
Article 17 consecrates an open-clause on fundamental rights concreteness, which, 
in turn, allows immediate applicability of rights that have a similar/analogous nature to 
liberty rights.134 This permits bridging liberty rights and social rights, upgrading social 
rights sometimes more evanescent structure. From a comparative constitutional law 
perspective, article 17 is an innovative norm.135 
 
131 They have immediate applicability, bind public and private entities and benefit from rigorous limitations 
to their restriction (article 18, clearly inspired by article 1/3 from the German Grundgesetz); the right to 
“resist any order that infringes their rights, freedoms or guarantees and, when it is not possible to resort to 
the public authorities, to use force to repel any aggression” (article 21); furthermore, unless it also 
authorizes the Government to do so, the Assembly of the Republic (Parliament) has exclusive competence 
to legislate on liberty rights (b) n.º 1 article 165) – Although some social rights also benefit from this 
partially exclusive legislative competence from the Assembly of the Republic, given f), g) and h) no 1 
article 165 (bases of social security, national health service, nature/ecologic balance/cultural heritage and 
the e general regime governing rural and urban rentals); finally, amongst several material limits on 
constitutional amendment, “constitutional revision laws must respect citizens’ rights, freedoms and 
guarantees” (d) article 288).  
132 There are “three main narratives that were built around this inquiry: (i) Some authors defend a rigid 
bifurcation between liberty and social rights and even argue for an ontological superiority of liberty rights 
when compared with social rights. Far from conferring independent constitutional rights, social rights 
would be principles orientating the state’s action. (ii) On the other extreme of this discussion, others defend 
regime parity between both rights and refuse any distinction. Then, all infra constitutional legislation on 
social rights is a constitutional continuum. (iii) The majority of the doctrine supports an intermediate thesis 
– more or less equidistant – which states that there is no substantial hierarchy between rights (are indivisible, 
unitary and non-hierarchical), just a formal distinction, based either on different regimes, on State’s duties 
or even on the determinability of the right’s content.” (C. S. Botelho, “Aspirational constitutionalism, social 
rights prolixity… cit., pp. 72-73) 
133 C. S. Botelho, Os direitos sociais em tempos de crise… cit., pp. 313-321. 
134 Article 17 states the following: “The regime governing rights, freedoms and guarantees applies to those 
set out in Title II and to fundamental rights of an analogous nature.” 
135 C. B. Morais, Curso de Direito Constitucional… cit., p. 573, C. S. Botelho, Os direitos sociais em tempos 
de crise… cit., p. 122, and pp. 305-311, J. Miranda e R. Medeiros, “Anotação ao artigo 17.º”, Constituição 
Portuguesa Anotada, vol. I, cit., pp. 302-309, J. J. G. Canotilho and V. Moreira, A Constituição da 
República Portuguesa Anotada, vol. I, Coimbra Editora, Coimbra, 2017, pp. 370-378, and M. A. Vaz, 
Teoria da Constituição… cit., p. 160.  
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Social rights enforcement was unsettled during Troika’s intervention in Portugal 
(2011-2014).136 The Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Monetary 
International Fund, the European Commission and the European Central Bank compelled 
the Portuguese legislators to a very strict austerity programme. Consequently, several 
measures which distressed Portuguese societal tissue were implemented: public sector 
wage cuts, tax increases, flexibilization of dismissal rules, pensions cuts and other welfare 
benefits, privatization of public utilities, increased working hours (for civil servants and 
equivalent), convergence of pension systems (public and private sectors), amongst other 
measures.137 
In the beginning of the application of the Memorandum of Understanding, the 
PCC was criticized for its favor legislatoris jurisprudence.138 Yet, deference towards the 
legislator started to decrease by 2012, as the argument of a “transitional and exceptional 
circumstance” could not be sustained for a long period of time.139 In 2013/2014, the PCC 
considered the argument of the exceptional economic-financial conjuncture as 
surpassed.140  
PCC’s crisis jurisprudence received unprecedented attention and international 
coverage.141  If some acclaimed the Court’s unwillingness to convey with social state 
 
136 More generally, see M. Kumm, Taking ‘the dark side’ seriously: Constitutionalism and the question of 
constitutional progress. Or: Why is it fitting to have the 2016 ICON-S conference in Berlin, 13 (4) I.CON 
779, 777-785 (2015).  
137 C. S. Botelho, “Aspirational constitutionalism, social rights prolixity… cit., p. 79.  
138 During 2010 and 2011, PPC judgments seemed to adhere to the crisis’ rhetoric and to refrain from 
interfering with budgetary impositions and international commitments. See PCC ruling number 399/2010, 
from October 27th (retroactive personal income tax pensions); and number 396/2011, from September 21th, 
(public sector wage cuts).  
139 Therefore, its tolerance to the crisis argument would be inversely proportional to the duration of the 
crisis. PCC ruling number 353/2012, from July 5th (suspension of the Christmas-month (13th month) and 
holiday-month (14th month) payments of annual salaries, both for persons who receive salaries from public 
entities and for persons who receive retirement pensions from the public social security system). This 
judgment was highly controversial, as the PCC limited the retroactive effects of the declaration of 
unconstitutionally on the grounds of “exceptionally important public interest” (article 282/4). In fact, the 
PCC suspended its decision’s effects in order to permit the full execution of the state budget (which had 
already been executed for half a year).   
PCC ruling number 187/2013, from April 5th (review of the constitutionality of norms contained in the State 
Budget Law for 2013).  
140 PCC ruling number 862/2013, from December 19th (Civil Service Law – Statute governing the 
Retirement of the Public Sector Staff); number 413/2014, from May 30th (review of the constitutionality of 
norms contained in the State Budget Law for 2014 – the PCC declared the unconstitutionality of the 
majority of the measures syndicated); number 575/2014, from August 14th (proposed creation of an 
additional tax – “Sustainability Contribution” – updating pensions in the public social protection system); 
number 3/2016, from January 13th (elimination of the lifetime annuity for former political officials, declared 
unconstitutional on the grounds of the violation of the principle of the protection of trust).    
141 C. Kilpatrick, “Constitutions, social rights and sovereign debt states in Europe: a challenging new area 
of constitutional inquiry”, European University Institute 13-14 (2015), and J. C. da Costa, “Tribunal 
Constitucional e debate público”, 40 Anos de Políticas de Justiça em Portugal, Almedina, 2016, pp. 113-
141.  
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downsizing, others criticized it for obstructing free-market economy, and even suggested 
the “dissolution of the Constitutional Court as an independent court.”142  
For current purposes, we can discuss if the ‘constitutional identity’ of some EU 
Member States (such as Greece, Spain, Portugal or Italy) was respected by the European 
entities during their international bailouts. To Francisco Balaguer Callejón, the 
“economic interpretation of the Constitution that was imposed all over Europe, and to 
which a constitutional interpretation of the crisis shall have been opposed to”, did not 
respect the pluralist democracy principle.143 It is also important to mention that the PCC 
was not some sort of “‘Don Quixote’ fighting the windmills of austerity”, as it “made 
every effort to internalize the European and international obligations of the Portuguese 
state.”144 
 
2.5. The insular autonomic regime 
Portugal was always a unitary state. With the transition to democracy, after several 
decades of dictatorship, the democratic principle called for some decentralization of the 
majority deliberation: the insular autonomic regime.145 Nevertheless and contrary to other 
constitutional experiences (such as Spain), autonomy is not a right per se but a 
“constitutional status”. How many regions there may be and which competences they may 
have is not open to discussion. It is the Constitution that defines which regions there are 
– in the Portuguese case, the Azores and Madeira archipelagos – and the extension of 
their competences.146  
According to article 6 of the Portuguese Constitution, Portugal is a partial and 
homogeneous regional unitary state.147 In fact, there is a single Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
 
142 See generally, A. Dimopoulos, “PIGS and Pearls: State of Economic Emergency, Right to Resistance 
and Constitutional Review in the Context of the Eurozone Crisis”, Vienna Journal on International 
Constitutional Law, 2013, 7 (4), pp. 501-520, C. S. Botelho, “Aspirational constitutionalism, social rights 
prolixity… cit., pp. 78-81, L. Gordillo Pérez, “Derechos Sociales y Austeridad”, Lex Social, 2014, pp. 34-
56, N. Rodean, “Social rights in our backyard: ‘Social Europe’ between standardization and economic crisis 
across the continent”, European Social Charter and the challenges of the XXI Century, Edizioni Scientifiche 
Italiane, 2014, pp. 23-49, pp. 41-42, and S. Corado, N. Garoupa & P. Magalhães, Judicial Behaviour Under 
Austerity – An Empirical Analysis of Behavioral Changes in the Portuguese Constitutional Court, 2002-
2016, JLC 26 (2017), at 10. 
143 F. Balaguer Callejón, “El final de una época dorada, cit., p. 101. Similarly, C. S. Botelho, Os direitos 
sociais em tempos de crise… cit., pp. 487-488.  
144 F. P. Coutinho and N. Piçarra, “Portugal: The Impact of European Integration… cit., pp. 618-619.  
145 M. L. Amaral, A Forma da República – Uma introdução ao estudo do direito constitucional, Coimbra 
Editora, Coimbra, 2005, pp. 367-378. 
146 Idem, p. 371.  
147 See J. Miranda, “Anotação ao artigo 6.º”, Constituição Portuguesa Anotada, vol. I, cit., pp. 138-147, 
and J. J. G. Canotilho & V. Moreira, Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, cit., pp. 642-651.  
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power, but with two autonomous regions with limited legislative, executive and 
international powers.148 Along with Continental Portugal, they form the whole of the 
Portuguese Republic. Why these regions and not others?  
They were established due to their insularity and historical autonomic aspirations. 
Article 225, § 1, very clearly  establishes that “the grounds for the specific political and 
administrative regime of the Azores and Madeira archipelagos are their geographic, 
economic, social and cultural characteristics and the island populations’ historic 
aspirations to autonomy.”149 In a similar tone, article 229, § 1 asserts that “in cooperation 
with the self-government organs, the entities that exercise sovereignty shall ensure the 
economic and social development of the autonomous regions, with a particular view to 
the correction of the inequalities derived from insularity.”150 
Therefore, article 81, e), states that “in the economic and social field the state is 
under a priority duty to promote the correction of the inequalities derived from the 
autonomous regions’ insular nature and encourage those regions’ progressive integration 
into broader economic areas within a national or international framework.”151 
Partial regional autonomy (self-government) is therefore one of the identifying 
traits of the Portuguese constitutional system. This is so vital, that regional autonomy is 
an “eternity clause”, refrained from the amendment process (article 288, o) of the 
Constitution). 
Article 225, § 3 of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic establishes that the 
regional political and administrative autonomy does not affect the “integrity of the 
sovereignty of the state and must be exercised within the overall framework of this 
Constitution”. Besides the Constitution, the Political and Administrative Statutes of each 
of the Autonomous Region, regulate the exercise of self-government. Addressing 
“disputes over the autonomy”, the regional self-governance regime enhanced through the 
various amendments to the Portuguese Constitution.   
A singular trait of the Portuguese Constitution is that, as far as political 
associations and parties are concerned, “no party may be formed with a name or manifesto 
objectives that show it has a regional nature or scope” (article 51, § 4). The prohibition 
 
148 See F. U. Calvão, M. F. Campos and C. S. Botelho, Introdução ao Direito Público, Almedina, Coimbra, 
2016, p. 155, and R. Lanceiro, “The international powers of the Portuguese autonomous regions of Azores 
and Madeira”, Revista da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Lisboa, 51, 2010, pp. 293-320.  
149 J. J. G. Canotilho and V. Moreira, Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, vol. II, cit., pp. 641-
644.   
150 Idem, ibidem, pp. 688-692.  
151 Idem, Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, I, cit., pp. 964-974.  
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of regional parties has been criticized by some, as it restricts freedom of association, 
contributes to low turnout rates in the autonomous regions, and does not respect the 
autonomy of the regions.  
It is relevant to mention that this prohibition, consecrated in 1976, was thought to 
be short-term. In fact, during the Portuguese transition to democracy, there was come 
concern about separatist tendencies in the autonomous regions of Azores and Madeira. 
Although these fears were unfounded, the prohibition of regional parties was even 
reinforced, as it moved from the organizational part to the fundamental rights 
catalogue.152  
 
2.6. Flexibility of the legal definition of the right to strike  
The right to strike is, under the Portuguese Constitution, a fundamental right 
(placed in the rights, liberties and guarantees catalogue) and immediately applicable to 
public and private entities (article 18). According to article 57, § 2, “workers have the 
competence to define the scope of the interests that are to be defended by a strike and the 
law may not limit that scope.”153  
The lack of a legal conceptualization of the right to strike does not allow a 
distinction between conducts that can be considered strikes and other behaviours that 
should be excluded from constitutional protection.154 If some scholars blame the 
constitutional prohibition of legal limitation of “the scope of the interests that are to be 
defended by a strike” for the absence of a legal concept of strike,155 others argue that this 
legal flexibility should be restricted by a legal definition which takes into consideration 
the sociological perspective of the strike.156 Nevertheless, article 57, § 2 displays “a rare 
case of express prohibition of fundamental rights’ restrictions”.157 
Additionally, article 57, § 4, explicitly prohibits employers’ lockouts. A lockout 
is a crime, punishable with imprisonment up to two years and may result in a fine applied 
to the employer (articles 544 and 545 of the Portuguese Labour Code).  
 
152 J. Miranda, “Anotação ao artigo 51.º”, Constituição Portuguesa Anotada, vol. I, cit., pp. 1008-1021, p. 
1016, and J. J. G. Canotilho & V. Moreira, Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, cit., p. 658. 
153 See J. J. G. Canotilho & V. Moreira, Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, cit., pp. 750-760, 
and R. Medeiros, “Anotação ao artigo 57.º”, Constituição Portuguesa Anotada, vol. I, cit., pp. 1124-1135.  
154 J. J. G. Canotilho e J. Leite, “Ser ou não ser uma greve (a propósito da chamada ‘greve self-service’)”, 
Questões Laborais, 13, 1999, pp. 3-44, p. 15. 
155 J. J. Abrantes, “A greve no novo Código do Trabalho”, A Reforma do Código do Trabalho, Coimbra 
Editora, Coimbra, 2014, pp. 651-661, p. 74, and P. R. Martinez, Direito do Trabalho, Almedina, Coimbra, 
7.ª ed., 2015, p. 1194. 
156 B. Xavier, 1984, p. 62. 
157 J. J. G. Canotilho & V. Moreira, Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, cit., p. 756.  
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The Portuguese prohibition of lockout is so wide that the Portuguese state had to 
make reservations to the European Social Charter: Portugal formally declared that the 
obligations entered under article 6, § 4 shall in no way invalidate the prohibition of 
lockouts as enshrined in the Portuguese Constitution.    
Another interesting aspect is that the constitutional prohibition of lockout was 
subject to the PCC appreciation, with the argument that it could be a case of 
unconstitutional constitutional norm. In Ruling 480/89, without formally answering the 
vexata quaestio of whether unconstitutional constitutional norms were a valid 
constitutional theory, the PCC decided that the prohibition of lockout did not violate the 
equality principle.158 In fact, it considered that equality should not be refrained in a formal 
dimension, but share a material dimension as well. The material dimension of the equality 
principle allows to treat differently what is different and equally what is equal. In this 
sense, the Court considered that the employer and the employee were not in an equal 
position, and therefore the law could treat them in a different way. If the PCC had decided 
otherwise, probably it would have to deem that constitutional norm unconstitutional.  
 
2.7. Prohibition of military/ paramilitary, racist or fascists organizations – Limits to 
pluralism?  
Regarding the freedom of organization, the triad violent, racist and fascist is 
constitutionally forbidden. Article 46.º, § 4 states that “armed associations, military, 
militarized or paramilitary-type associations and organisations that are racist or display a 
fascist ideology are not permitted.”159 On the one hand, the Portuguese Constitution 
prohibits parties which resort to or encourage violence (armed associations, military, 
militarized or paramilitary-type), even if it they are not subversive or racist per se. Such 
exclusion flows from the rule of law, democratic principle and the unicity of the armed 
forces (article 275, § 2).160  
On the other hand, racist organizations are prohibited, as they violate the human 
dignity principle (equal social dignity). There are a few historical examples, such as the 
apartheid, some colonialist organizations, holocaust, genocide, skinheads’ movements, 
 
158 From 13.07.1989.   
159 See J. Miranda, “Anotação ao artigo 46.º”, Constituição Portuguesa Anotada, vol. I, cit., pp. 952-960, 
and J. J. G. Canotilho & V. Moreira, Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, cit., pp. 642-651.  
160 According to Article 275, no. 2, “the Armed Forces shall be composed exclusively of Portuguese citizens 
and shall have a single organizational structure for the whole of Portuguese territory”. See J. J. G. Canotilho 
and V. Moreira, Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, vol. II, cit., pp. 868-872.  
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etc.).161 The reference to “racist” organizations was not in the original version of the 
Portuguese Constitution, being added later through the constitutional amendment of 1997.  
Additionally, the prohibition of fascism is a legacy from the Portuguese authoritarian 
regime of 1933-1974. The Preamble of the Portuguese Constitution very clearly attests 
that “on the 25th of April 1974 the Armed Forces Movement crowned the long resistance 
and reflected the deepest feelings of the Portuguese people by overthrowing the fascist 
regime.” Some doctrine considers such prohibition an unconstitutional constitutional 
norm or a “material constitutional self-rupture”, since it violates the principles of equality 
and pluralism.162 Is it justified to prohibit only extreme-radical-right and not also extreme-
radical-left organizations, such as some communist organizations which historically were 
also accountable for massive deaths and human rights violations? 
The Constitutional Court is responsible for declaring, according to the terms and 
for the purposes of Law no. 64/78, dated 6 October, that an organization has adopted a 
fascist ideology and for decreeing its respective abolition” (article 10 of the Law of the 
Portuguese Constitutional Court).163 Regarding the Parliament, “members of the 
Assembly of the Republic shall lose their seat in the event that (…) they are convicted of 
participating in organizations that are racist or display a fascist ideology” (article 160, § 
1, d)).  
 
2.8. A sui generis system of government and the government’s power to legislate in 
all the subjects that are not reserved to the parliament  
After several decades of parliamentary instability (during the First Republic, 
1910-1926) and dictatorship (1926-1933 and 1933-1974), the Portuguese Constitution of 
1976 sought to establish a system of government that would emphasize checks and 
balances between the main political organs: President, government and parliament.164  
The Portuguese political system is mostly characterized as semi-presidential, 
since the President of the Republic is directly elected and the government (and Prime-
 
161 J. J. G. Canotilho & V. Moreira, Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, cit., p. 648.  
162 J. Miranda, “Anotação ao artigo 46.º”, cit., pp. 959-960. Therefore, the Author recommends that this 
article be interpreted restrictively (according to Article 18, no. 2): the prohibition only affects the political 
organization and not freedom of speech; by “fascist ideology” one should interpret an ideology similar to 
the Portuguese pre-revolution period or to the Italian fascist experience, which influenced the Portuguese 
one. In agreement with this last assertion, see J. J. G. Canotilho & V. Moreira, Constituição da República 
Portuguesa Anotada, cit., p. 648.   
163 Law no. 28/82, of 15 November, modified by Law no. 143/85, of 26 November, Law no. 85/89, of 7 
September, Law no. 88/95, of 1 September, Law no. 13-A/98, of 26 February, and Organic Law no. 1/2001).  
164 V. Canas, “The Semi-Presidential System”, ZaöRV, 64, 2004, pp. 095-124, p. 95.  
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Minister) are politically responsible to the legislature.165 Others, though, prefer the 
designation of “premier-presidential system”,166 or even “parliamentary system.”167  
The Portuguese system was influenced by the French semi-presidentialism, and 
the rationalized parliamentarism of the Weimar Republic.168 The parliamentary traits are 
the following: the government as a political autonomous organ (article 182); the 
government is responsible to the parliament, either through the consideration of the 
government’s programme (article 192), the request for confidence motion (article 193) or 
the motion of no confidence (article 194); and the ministerial counter-signature (article 
140). The characteristics of the presidential regime are three: direct election of the 
President (article 120), presidential veto (article 136), and presidential powers of political 
indirizzo (such as article 133, d)). Last but not least, the rationalized parliamentary traits 
relate to the government’s double responsibility to the parliament and to the President 
(articles 190 and 191), and the dissolution of the parliament by the President (article 172).  
Notwithstanding external influences, the Portuguese Constitution reveals some 
unique traits. The government is not necessarily formed by the party that wins the 
legislative  elections. Article 187, § 1 of the Constitution affirms that the “the President 
of the Republic appoints the Prime Minister after consulting the parties with seats in the 
Assembly of the Republic and in the light of the electoral results”, but he needs 
parliamentary support in order to get his programme expressly or implicitly approved 
(article 192).169 
Even if the nomination of the current Portuguese government – a contraption 
(geringonça) formed by the Socialist Party (PS), the Communist Party (PCE) and the far-
left party Left Bloc (BE) – was consistent with the Constitution, it generated some 
criticism amongst PSD and CDS-PP, the elections winning parties.170 However, while the 
assertion that the party/colligation with the highest percentage of votes wins the elections 
 
165 G. Passarelli, “The government in two semi-presidential systems: France and Portugal in a comparative 
perspective”, French Politics, 8 (4), 2010, pp. 402-428, O. A. Neto and M. C. Lobo, “Portugal’s semi-
presidentialism (re)considered: An assessment of the President’s role in the policy process, 1976-2006”, 
Portugal in the Twenty-First Century: Politics, Society and Economics, 2012, p. 49, and V. Canas, “The 
Semi-Presidential System”, ZaöRV, 64, 2004, pp. 095-124, p. 116.   
166 R. Elgie, Semi-presidentialism – Sub-Types and Democratic Performance, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2011, pp. 29, 122, 132–43. 
167 J. J. G. Canotilho and V. Moreira, Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, vol. II, cit., p. 19.  
168 M. A. Vaz, R. Carvalho, C. S. Botelho and A. T. Ribeiro, Direito Constitucional – O sistema 
constitucional português, Universidade Católica Editora, Porto, 2015, pp. 30-37.  
169 C. S. Botelho, “Portugal: The State of Liberal Democracy”, cit., pp. 230-234. 
170 In my opinion, behind this political distress was the fact that there was a kind of “gentlemen’s 
agreement” according to which the political alliances in the Parliament would be made known to the 
electorate a priori and not a posteriori. 
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is correct, it does not mean that it is entitled to form government. One thing is to win the 
legislative elections, another one is to form government.  
Another interesting trait of the Portuguese political system is that the President 
cannot dismiss the government at his discretion, but only “when it becomes necessary to 
do so in order to ensure the normal operation of the democratic institutions and after first 
consulting the Council of State” (article 195, § 2). The Council of State is “the political 
organ that advises the President of the Republic” (article 141).  
In continuity with the previous Constitution of 1933, the current Constitution 
grants the government a wide range of legislative powers: (i) exclusive powers “to 
legislate on matters that concern his own organization and modus operandi” (article 198, 
§ 2); (ii) independent powers to legislate “on matters that do not fall within the exclusive 
competence of the Assembly of the Republic” (article 198, § 1, a)), and therefore law 
(parliament’s legislation) and decree-law (government’s legislation) share the exact same 
legal status, being mutually revocable (lex posteriori derrogat lex anteriori); (iii) and 
dependent powers to legislate on matters of the competence of the Parliament (article 
165), “subject to authorization” (article 198, § 1, b)) or to “make executive laws that 
develop the principles or the general bases of the legal regimes contained in laws that 
limit themselves to those principles or general bases” (article 198, § 1, c)).171 
In Europe, parliaments are decreasing their political and legislative strength in 
favour of governments, which possess indirect democratic legitimacy.172 The length of 
the Portuguese government’s independent/concurring powers are unique in a comparative 
constitutional law perspective.173 Although the parliament is the most important 
legislative organ – since qualitatively the utmost relevant subjects belong to its area of 
legislative competence (articles 161, 164 and 165)174 and it has primacy even above 
 
171 J. J. G. Canotilho and V. Moreira, Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, vol. II, cit., pp. 477-
483.   
172 C. B. Morais, O Sistema Político no Contexto da Erosão da Democracia Representativa, Almedina, 
Coimbra, 2017, p. 722, and P. Otero, Direito Constitucional Português, I, Almedina, Coimbra, 2010, p. 
209.  
173 C. B. Morais, O Sistema Político… cit., pp. 719-723, and J. Miranda and J. P. da Silva, “Anotação ao 
artigo 161.º”, Constituição Portuguesa Anotada, vol. II, cit., pp. 502-516, p. 506.  
174 See J. Miranda and C. S. Botelho, “Anotações aos artigos 164.º e 165.º”, Constituição Portuguesa 
Anotada, vol. II, cit., pp. 527-555.  
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governmental legislation (article 169)175 – the truth is that quantitatively, the government 
legislates much more.176 In fact, the government produces 80% of the legislation.177  
Some argue that the extent of governmental competences is too generous and 
should be shortened through constitutional amendment.178 To counterbalance the 
government’s (possibly) excessive legislative powers, the President plays a relevant role. 
Unlike the veto of parliament legislation, which can be surpassed,179 the veto of 
government legislation is definitive (article 136, § 4).180  
Therefore, the Portuguese President is more than a mere “pouvoir neutre” 
(Benjamin Constant) which preserves national stability, guarantees checks and balances 
between the organs of the state and guards the Constitution of 1976. Willingly, the 
President can play a more interventive political role.  
 
2.9. Restrictiveness of referenda 
National referenda were introduced, in a very restrictive way, by the second 
constitutional amendment of 1989. 1997’s constitutional amendment implemented a 
specific referendum for the creation of administrative regions (article 256) and a regional 
referendum (article 232, § 2).  In practice, Portugal only had three national referenda 
(1998 – abortion; 1998 – regionalization; and 2007 – abortion) since the transition to 
democracy. 
There are several concrete principles guiding referenda, such as: the existence of 
a relevant national, regional or local interest at stake (articles 115, § 3 and 232, § 2); 
unicity of the referendum subject (article 115, § 6); yes or no questions (article 115, no 
 
175 According to article 169, no 1: “1. Save for those passed in the exercise of the Government’s exclusive 
legislative competence, executive laws may, upon a motion made by ten Members of the Assembly of the 
Republic within the thirty days following their publication (…) be subjected to consideration by the 
Assembly of the Republic with a view to causing them to cease to be in force or amending them.”  
176 M. A. Vaz, R. Carvalho, C. S. Botelho and A. T. Ribeiro, Direito Constitucional, cit., pp. 52-58.  
177 C. B. de Morais, As Leis Reforçadas – As leis reforçadas pelo procedimento no âmbito dos critérios 
estruturantes das relações entre actos legislativos, Coimbra, 1998, p. 193, J. Valle, A participação do 
Governo no exercício da função legislativa, Coimbra, 2004, p. 294, and J. Miranda and J. P. da Silva, 
“Anotação ao artigo 161.º”, Constituição Portuguesa Anotada, vol. II, cit., pp. 502-516, pp. 505-506.  
178 J. de M. Alexandrino, “A preponderância do Governo no exercício da função legislativa”, Legislação 
(Cadernos do INA), 2009, pp. 99-108.  
179 According to article 136, § 2: “If the Assembly of the Republic confirms its vote by an absolute majority 
of all the Members of the Assembly of the Republic in full exercise of their office, the President of the 
Republic must enact the legislative act within a time limit of eight days counting from its receipt.” 
180 Although a government with a parliamentary majority can always surpass the presidential veto, through 
article 197, § 1, d): “In the exercise of its political functions the Government has the competences to present 
and submit government bills and draft resolutions to the Assembly of the Republic”. Then, the government 
can “copy-paste” its law-decree into a draft resolution to the parliament. If the parliament approves the draft 
and the subsequent law, the President can veto that law, but the parliament is able to surpass the veto by an 
absolute majority (article 136, § 2).  
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6); and the existence of a binding effect only “when the number of voters exceeds half 
the number of registered electors” (article 115, § 11).181  
A unique trait of the Portuguese system is that referenda are not for the immediate 
popular approval or disapproval, but to decide whether that legal diploma (law, 
convention, local decree, etc.) should be approved or rejected by the pertinent legislative 
organs. The idea was to avoid populist manipulations in favour of representative 
democracy, although this argument is weak given the restrictiveness and requirements of 
referenda design in the Portuguese system.182  
A quorum of participation was introduced by 1997’s constitutional amendment. 
Accordingly, it is required that the number of voters exceeds “half the number of 
registered electors” (article 115, § 11) for the referendum to have binding effect. The ratio 
legis was to avoid binding referendum results over relevant national questions approved 
by an electoral minority.183  
However, this rule has been heavily criticized by some Portuguese doctrine, since 
it has the pernicious effect of encouraging abstention.184 If turnout is not over 50%, then 
the referendum is nonbinding and merely consultative. This rule could make sense if our 
Constitution allowed referenda over constitutional issues.185 Yet, such referenda are 
expressly forbidden in Portugal(article 115, § 4, a)), as well in other states such as Greece 
and Luxembourg.  
 
2.10. Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a constitutional continuum 
 Article 16, § 2, regarding the scope and interpretation of fundamental rights, states 
that “the constitutional norms concerning fundamental rights must be interpreted and 
completed in harmony with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” The question, 
therefore, is the following: Is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) a 
constitutional continuum or a mere interpretative instrument? 
 
181 J. Miranda, “O referendo e o plebiscito: a experiência portuguesa”, Cuestiones Constitucionales, 19, 
2008, pp. 149-171, p. 158.  
182 Idem, p. 159. 
183 J. J. G. Canotilho and V. Moreira, Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, vol. II, Coimbra 
Editora, Coimbra, 2010, p. 101.  
184 J. J. G. Canotilho and V. Moreira, Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, vol. II, cit., p. 101, 
J. Miranda, “O referendo e o plebiscito: a experiência portuguesa”, Cuestiones Constitucionales, 19, 2008, 
pp. 149-171, p. 160, P. Magalhães, “A necessária eliminação do n.º 11 do artigo 115.º”, A Constituição 
Revista, (eds. J.A. Tavares, M. P. Maduro, N. Garoupa e P. Magalhães), FFMS, Lisboa, 2011, pp. 103-105, 
and Raquel Brízida Castro, “Como salvar a Democracia dos seus ‘novos donos’”, Público, 04.06.2019, 
https://www.publico.pt/2019/06/04/politica/opiniao/salvar-democracia-novos-donos-1875166  
185 J. Miranda, “O referendo e o plebiscito: a experiência portuguesa”, cit., p. 160.  
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To some doctrine, article 16, § 2 is an interpretative norm, as it refers to an exterior 
parameter of interpretation: The UDHR.186 In this sense, the Portuguese Constitution 
should be interpreted in consonance with the Declaration. An example could be article 2 
of the UDHR, which, when interpreted toe to toe with the Portuguese prohibition of 
discrimination (article 13, § 2 of the Constitution187) clarifies that this prohibition is not 
exhaustive, but merely suggestive. Therefore, we can argue that the Constitution also 
prohibits discriminating people with disabilities.188  
Other scholars, though, enlarge the above interpretation and argue that Article 16, 
§ 2 proceeds to the formal reception of the UDHR as a material extension of the written 
constitution. The UDHR thus has a supra-constitutional value. 189 Concretely, it expands 
the fundamental rights catalogue (articles 24 to 79) and other fundamental rights 
consecrated elsewhere – in ordinary laws or in international norms – derived from the 
“open clause” in matters of fundamental rights (article 16, § 1).190 Accordingly, and as 
the Portuguese Constitution lacks a general permission of fundamental rights’ restriction, 
article 29, § 2 of the UDHR could be immediately applicable as a constitutional norm for 
restriction.191  
This doctrinal approach is criticized by authors that highlight its inconsistency 
with article 18, § 2 of the Portuguese Constitution, which limits fundamental rights’ 
restrictions “in cases expressly provided for in the Constitution”.192 Furthermore, human 
rights law instruments should never be interpreted in a way that diminishes human rights 
protection (article 53 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union).193 
 
186 J. J. G. Canotilho and V. Moreira, Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, vol. I, cit., p. 367.  
187 Article 13, § 2: “No one may be privileged, favoured, prejudiced, deprived of any right or exempted 
from any duty for reasons of ancestry, sex, race, language, territory of origin, religion, political or 
ideological beliefs, education, economic situation, social circumstances or sexual orientation.” 
188 C. S. Botelho, “A indiferença à diferença”, Observador, 17/04/2018, available at: 
https://observador.pt/opiniao/a-indiferenca-a-diferenca/  
189 J. Miranda, “Anotação ao artigo 16.º”, Constituição Portuguesa Anotada, vol. I, cit., pp. 289-301, p. 
290.  
190 Article 16, no. 1, states that: “The fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution shall not exclude any 
others set out in applicable international laws and legal rules.” About the Portuguese “open clause”, see A. 
M. G. Martins and M. P. Roque, “Universality and Binding Effect of Human Rights from a Portuguese 
Perspective”, The Universalism of Human Rights (ed. R. Arnold), Springer, Heidelberg, 2013, pp. 297-324, 
p. 309.  
191 Article 29, § 2 foresees the following: “In the exercise of their rights and freedoms, everyone shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition 
and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public 
order and the general welfare in a democratic society.” 
192 J. J. G. Canotilho and V. Moreira, Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, vol. I, cit., pp. 367-
369.  
193 Which states that: “Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by Union 
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II. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS TO FREE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE  
 
1. Free speech 
1.1. Constitutional standards of scrutiny for free speech 
Article 37 of the Portuguese Constitution is a cluster-right, which grants freedom 
of expression and information. If we consider freedom of expression, we must associate 
it with human dignity (article 1) and the right to the development of personality (article 
26, § 1).194 Freedom of expression is also implied in freedom of conscience and religion 
(article 41), freedom of cultural creation (article 42), and freedom to learn and to teach 
(article 43), and is a prerequisite of access to law (article 20, § 1), the right to demonstrate 
(article 45, § 2), or freedom to choose a profession (article 47).195   
It is also relevant to mention that free speech (article 37) and freedom of 
association (article 46) are constitutionally separate rights. Commercial speech is not an 
autonomous category, such as in the United States. As freedom of expression and 
information are granted jointly in the Portuguese Constitution, types of 
speech/information that are ruled by law are the following: Law of Advertising and 
advertisement posting and registration;196 Television Law;197 Journalist’s Status;198 Press 
Law;199 and Radio Law.200 
José de Melo Alexandrino distinguishes four types of limits to freedom of 
expression:201   
(i) immediate limits to freedom of expression: the Portuguese Constitution 
only contemplates one limit, which is that “everyone has the right to freely 
express and divulge their thoughts in words, images or by any other 
 
law and international law and by international agreements to which the Union, the Community or all the 
Member States are party, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States’ constitutions.” 
194 J. E. M. Machado, Liberdade de Expressão – Dimensões constitucionais da esfera pública no sistema 
social, Coimbra Editora, Coimbra, 2002, pp. 372.  
195 J. Miranda, Manual de Direito Constitucional, IV, p. 453.  
196 Law no. 97/88, 17.08.1988.  
197 Law no. 27/2007, 30.07.2007. 
198 Law no. 1/99, 13.01.1999.  
199 Law no. 2/99, 13.01.1999.  
200 Law no. 4/2001, 23.02.2001.  
201 J. de M. Alexandrino, “Anotação ao artigo 37.º”, Constituição Portuguesa Anotada, vol. I, cit., pp. 844-
859, pp. 850-851.  
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means” (article 37, § 1), therefore plagiarism is not protected by freedom 
of speech;  
(ii) special limitations to some constitutional dimensions of freedom of 
speech, such as article 270 (restrictions on the exercise of rights by full-
time military personnel and militarized agents on active service and agents 
of the security services and forces);202  
(iii) exceptional legal limitations resulting from a proportionality analysis 
(article 18, § 2 and 3) in order to balance freedom of expression with other 
fundamental rights or values, such as dignity, morals, privacy, image, and 
rule of law – we can exemplify with the criminal norms that punish 
defamation, insult203, deprivation of privacy, incitement to war and 
violence;204 
(iv) real conflict between freedom of speech and other fundamental rights in a 
given situation, which should be addressed through “practical 
reconciliation” (praktische Konkordanz).205  
Notwithstanding the prohibition of censorship (article 37, § 2), “prevention of 
abuse of freedom of expression can be licit either through limited and exceptional 
criminal protection, or through disciplinary or administrative sanctions (article 37, § 
3)”.206 Article 37, § 1 very clearly asserts that “everyone has the right to freely express 
and divulge their thoughts in words, images or by any other means (…) without hindrance 
or discrimination.” This means that, apart from the “cases expressly provided for in the 
Constitution” (article 18, § 2), all equally benefit from freedom of speech, without 
discrimination.207 
PCC jurisprudence lacks leading cases regarding the place and meaning of 
freedom of speech in the Portuguese constitutional context.208 However, it is relevant to 
 
202 Article 270 states that “strictly to the extent required by the specific demands of the respective functions, 
the law may establish restrictions on the exercise of the rights of expression, meeting, demonstration, 
association and collective petition by full-time military personnel and militarized agents on active service 
and agents of the security services and forces, and on their legal capacity to stand for election. In the case 
of the security forces, even when their right to form trade unions is recognized, the law may preclude the 
right to strike.” See PCC ruling no. 384/03, 15.07.2003.  
203 See PCC ruling no. 345/2017, 28.06.2017.   
204 Articles 180, 181, 192, 297, 298 and 326 of the Portuguese Penal Code. See PCC ruling no. 605/07, 
11.12.2007.   
205 See PCC ruling no. 407/07, 11.07.2007.  
206 See PCC ruling no. 292/2008, 29.05.2008. 
207 J. J. G. Canotilho and V. Moreira, Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, vol. I, cit., p. 573.  
208 J. de M. Alexandrino, “Anotação ao artigo 37.º”, Constituição Portuguesa Anotada, vol. I, cit., pp. 844-
859, p. 857.  
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mention that the Portuguese State has been recurrently condemned by the European Court 
of Human Rights for limiting free speech.209  
There are several examples concerning judiciary acting and free speech, but I will 
focus on one case. José Manuel Fernandes, a well-known Portuguese journalist and 
editor, was found guilty of defamation by the Portuguese courts and condemned to pay 
€60,000 for an editorial article he wrote in 2006.  
In the article, entitled “The strategy of the spider”, Fernandes gave his opinion on 
the election of Justice Noronha Nascimento to the post of President of the Supreme Court 
of Justice and its significance, from his point of view, for the judiciary and the country. 
Fernandes considered Justice Noronha Nascimento the personification of the “dark side” 
of the Portuguese justice system, and wrote that he “has been weaving a web of 
connections of back-scratching, of favours and undertakings (there is an even worse word 
but I will avoid it)” and “presented himself to voters – that is to say, to his peers, and 
those whom he helped to promote to a position from which one day they would be able 
to elect him”. 
The ECHR ruled that “there is no doubt that this issue was a matter of legitimate 
public interest. (…) (Q)uestions concerning the functioning of the justice system, an 
institution that is essential for any democratic society, relate to a matter of public interest 
(…) In the instant case, these questions also relate to those who are elected to represent 
the various institutions within the judiciary. The first applicant’s article therefore 
concerned a sphere in which restrictions on freedom of expression are to be strictly 
interpreted.”210 
The Court reinforced that “members of the judiciary acting in an official capacity 
may be subject to wider limits of acceptable criticism than ordinary citizens (…) the 
President of the Supreme Court of Justice cannot be considered to be in the same position 
as any other judge: on the one hand, he is also the President of the HCJ; on the other hand, 
as the President of the Supreme Court of Justice he is the fourth-highest-ranking figure 
of State with a sit on the Council of State. The exercise of these roles is not part of 
adjudication. Thus, his ability to defend himself in public is wider than those of judges 
who exercise purely judicial acts.”211 
 
209 See ECHR cases Pais de Lima v. Portugal, no. 70465/12, 12.02.2019, Tavares de Almeida Fernandes 
and Almeida Fernandes v. Portugal, no. 31566/13, 17.01.2017, Sousa Goucha v. Portugal, no. 70434/12, 
22.03.2016, and Gouveia Gomes Fernandes and Freitas e Costa v. Portugal, no. 1529/08, 29.03.2011.   
210 Para. 62, ECHR case of Tavares de Almeida Fernandes and Almeida Fernandes v. Portugal, cit.  
211 Para. 63.  
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In concrete, the ECHR decided “that the impugned statements do not concern the 
way in which Judge N.N. exercised his functions as judge nor his ability to deliver a 
judgment or his conduct in that respect. They concerned Judge N.N.’s career within the 
judiciary and were therefore connected to the functions that he had exercised until then, 
namely as leader of the trade union association of judges and Vice-President of the HCJ. 
The Court notes in this regard that the first applicant’s remarks reflected the opinion that 
Judge N.N. owed his electoral success to actions he had pursued during his career and, in 
particular, the fact that he was an example of conservatism and corporatism, remarks 
which the domestic courts considered as being within the limits of criticism”.212 
The Court then considered “that the expressions used by the first applicant had a 
sufficiently close connection with material which had been previously published in the 
media about Judge N.N. and that he drew his opinion from that material and from 
conversations he had with different people from the judiciary (…) In this regard, although 
the first applicant’s allegations may be critical and harsh, they remain within the limits of 
freedom of opinion”.213 
In conclusion, the Court observed “that the domestic courts did not sufficiently 
explain how the first applicant had gone beyond his right to criticism and why his right 
to express his opinion should have been limited.”214 Additionally, the Court reiterated that 
“under the Convention, an award of damages for defamation must bear a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality to the injury to reputation suffered”.215 
In sum, the Court considered “that the domestic courts have exceeded the margin 
of appreciation afforded to them regarding limitations on debates of public interest and 
that there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between, on the one hand, the 
restriction on the first applicant’s right to freedom of expression and, secondly, the 
legitimate aim pursued”216, and condemn the Portuguese State for a violation of article 
10 of the Convention.217 
More recently, just some weeks ago, in the case of Antunes Emídio and Soares 
Gomes da Cruz v. Portugal (concerning polemic articles published in newspapers by the 
first applicant, a journalist and the second, a doctor), the ECHR condemned the 
 
212 Para. 67.  
213 Para. 71.  
214 Para. 75.  
215 Para. 77.  
216 Para. 81.  
217 Para. 82.  
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Portuguese State for violating article 10 of the Convention.218 Accordingly, the Court 
ruled that “the domestic courts have exceeded the margin of appreciation afforded to them 
regarding limitations on debates on matters of public interest and that there is no 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the restriction on the (…) applicant’s 
right to freedom of expression and the legitimate aim pursued. The balancing exercise 
had not been undertaken by the national authorities in full conformity with the criteria 
laid down in the Court’s case-law, and, in any event (…) there are strong reasons to 
substitute the Court’s view for that of the domestic courts.”219 
 
1.2. Interplay between free speech and crimes of opinion, display of religious 
symbols, blasphemy, hate speech, holocaust denial, and burning of political symbols.  
The Constitution also prohibits crimes of opinion, even when the opinions are 
linked with unconstitutional ideologies (such as racist or fascist).220 What the Constitution 
forbids are “armed associations, military, militarized or paramilitary-type associations 
and organizations that are racist or display a fascist ideology”, not the ideas themselves 
(article 46, § 4). 
From 1822 to 1911, Portugal was a constitutional monarchy with Catholicism as 
state religion.221 The Constitutional Charter of 1826 foresaw that “no one might be 
persecuted on grounds of religion, once it respects that of the state and does not offend 
public morality” (article 145, § 4). The republican Constitution of 1911 and the 
undemocratic Constitution of 1933 had similar (although lightened) formulas.222  
On the contrary, the Constitution of 1976 consecrates “the separation between 
church and state” as an eternity clause.223 Differently than the previous Portuguese 
constitutions (except the Constitution of 1911) and the constitutions of Italy, Spain and 
Poland, the current constitutional text has zero references to the Catholic Church.224   
 
218 Applications no. 75637/13 and 8114/14, 24.09.2019.  
219 Par. 65.  
220 J. J. G. Canotilho and V. Moreira, Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, vol. I, cit., p. 575.  
221 J. de S. e Brito, “Portugal”, [national report to] Religion and Discrimination Law in the European Union 
(ed. Mark Hill), European Consortium for Church and State Research, Trier, Institute for European 
Constitutional Law, 2012, pp. 271-280, p. 271, and P. P. Adragão, A Liberdade Religiosa e o Estado, 
Almedina, Coimbra, 2002, pp. 279-306.  
222 P. P. Adragão, A Liberdade Religiosa e o Estado, cit., pp. 318-360.  
223 Article 288, c). See M. B. Lopes, “A Liberdade religiosa em Portugal, a(s) Constituição(ções) e o 
Tribunal Constitucional”, Estudos em Homenagem ao Conselheiro Presidente Rui Moura Ramos, 
Almedina, Coimbra, 2016, pp. 299-361.     
224 J. Miranda and P. G. Marques, “Anotação ao artigo 41”, Constituição Portuguesa Anotada, vol. I, cit., 
pp. 890-921, p. 918.  
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The Constitution consecrates a specific non-discrimination clause regarding 
religion: “No one shall be privileged or favoured, or discriminated against, or deprived of 
any right or exempted from any duty, by reason of their (…) religion” (Article 13, no. 2). 
This clause must be read in connection with article 41, § 2: “No one shall be persecuted 
or deprived of rights or exempted from civil responsibilities or duties by reason of their 
convictions or religious observance.”  
Article 41, § 4 is clear when recognizing that “churches and other religious 
communities are separate from the state and are free to organize themselves and to 
exercise their functions and form of worship.” Article 2, § 2 of the Religious Freedom 
Law imposes that “the state shall not discriminate any church or religious community in 
relation to others.”225 The new concordat between Portugal and the Holy See (2004) was 
a step towards that compromise.226  
Portugal has a model of “cooperative separation between political power and 
religious phenomenon.”227 Hence, the Constitution rules that the state should be guided 
by religious neutrality. However, it is relevant to highlight that state’s neutrality does not 
equal to simply ignoring the religious phenomenon, insofar as religion plays a relevant 
role in the fields of solidarity, social inclusion and schooling.228 With a sociological 
argumentation, the PCC has decided that while “separation between church and state 
involve religious neutrality of the state”, it no longer involves “the obliviousness of the 
religious fact as a social fact.”229  
There are several references to this idea of non-interference, such as in the media 
(article 41, § 5: “Freedom is guaranteed to each denomination to teach its religion and to 
use its own media to carry out pertinent activities”), in public education and culture 
development (article 43, § 2: “The state shall not plan education and cultural development 
in accordance with any philosophical, aesthetic, political, ideological or religious rules”, 
and article 43, § 3: “Public education shall be nondenominational”), in the establishment 
 
225 Law no. 16/2001, 22.06.2001.  
226 Signed on 18th May 2004, and which substituted the Concordat of 1940. See R. M. Ramos, “A 
Concordata de 2004 e o Direito Internacional Privado Português”, Revista de Legislação e Jurisprudência, 
no. 3938, 2006, p. 277.  
227 J. B. Gouveia, Religious Liberty and Rule of Law in Constitutional State: the Portuguese Experience, 
available at: http://www.clr.mj.pt/sections/agenda/representacao-da-clr-no/representacao-da-clr-
no/downloadFile/file/Religious_Liberty_and_Rule_of_Law_-
_the_portuguese_experience.pdf?nocache=1268737957.04 , and J. Miranda and P. G. Marques, “Anotação 
ao artigo 41”, Constituição Portuguesa Anotada, vol. I, cit., pp. 890-921, p. 912.  
228 J. Miranda and P. G. Marques, “Anotação ao artigo 41”, Constituição Portuguesa Anotada, vol. I, cit., 
pp. 890-921, p. 912.  
229 PCC Ruling no. 423/87, 27.10.1987. 
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of political parties (article 51, § 3: 3. Without prejudice to the philosophy or ideology that 
underlies their manifestoes, political parties may not employ names that contain 
expressions which are directly related to any religion or church, or emblems that can be 
confused with national or religious symbols.”).  
Conscientious objection is granted in article 41, § 6 and it is intrinsically 
connected to the right to personal integrity (article 25, § 1). In this sense, conscientious 
objection does not pertain exclusively to religious sensitivities, but also to other 
conscience reasons, such as moral and philosophical ones.230 However, the Constitution 
clearly refers this subject to the infraconstitutional legislation. One example is the 
conscientious objection regarding abortion.231  
Portugal has no legislation that prohibits the wearing of religious clothing or 
symbols neither in public employment, nor in private employment. If approved, such 
legislation would probably be deemed unconstitutional, although a proportionality 
analysis could lead the PCC to decide otherwise (v.g., if it has provocative intentions or 
if it is so severe that it offends human dignity).232 Furthermore, there is no significant case 
law regarding the wearing of religious clothing or symbols.233  
And what about religious symbols (v.g., crucifixes) that are displayed in some 
public buildings – such as schools that function in old buildings from the last century? 
According to the Constitution and to the infraconstitutional legislation, they should not 
be displayed, although some exceptions might be tolerable in historical buildings or 
regions with steeped cultural tradition.234  
On the other hand, Portugal does not oblige pupils to attend classes in religious 
education. In its Ruling 423/87, the PCC decided that “the Constitution prohibits the 
organization of state education along religious lines, unwarranted distinctions between 
the churches and followers of different religions and the operation of state schools as 
agencies of religious education. However, the Constitution does not prohibit, or even 
 
230 J. Miranda and P. G. Marques, “Anotação ao artigo 41”, Constituição Portuguesa Anotada, vol. I, cit., 
pp. 890-921, pp. 920-921, and J. J. G. Canotilho and V. Moreira, Constituição da República Portuguesa 
Anotada, vol. I, cit., p. 616.  
231 Article 6 of Law no. 16/2007, 17.04.2007.  
232 J. J. G. Canotilho and V. Moreira, Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, vol. I, cit., p. 617.  
233 See E. Howard, Religious clothing and symbols in employment A legal analysis of the situation in the 
EU Member States, European Commission, 2017, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-
detail.cfm?item_id=608849  
234 J. Miranda and P. G. Marques, “Anotação ao artigo 41”, Constituição Portuguesa Anotada, vol. I, cit., 
pp. 890-921, p. 913. See also P. P. Adragão, “Crucifixos e Minaretes: a Religião no Espaço Público”, 
Revista de Direito Público, 3, 2010, pp. 201-210.  
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prevent, the state from allowing the various churches to give religious instruction in state 
schools, provided that they are treated equally.”235 
Blasphemy (speaking sacrilegiously about God or sacred things) is not expressly 
punishable by law and pertains to the area of constitutionally protected speech. 
Nevertheless, there are some “blasphemy-like provisions” on the Portuguese Penal 
Code236. Article 251 § 1 states that “a person who in public offends another person or 
mocks them on the ground of belief or religious practice, in a way likely to disturb public 
peace, shall be punished with imprisonment up to one year or a fine up to 120 days.” 
Article 252 foresees that “anyone who, by means of violence or significant threat, 
prevents or disrupts the legitimate exercise of religious worship or publicly vilifies the 
religious act or mocks it shall be punished with imprisonment up to one year or a fine up 
to 120 days.” 
We can conclude that, while blasphemy per se is not criminalized, some sort of 
“outrage to religious feelings” might be punishable. Still, it is not the disrespectful speech 
that is criminalized, but deliberate offence to religious liberty and public peace.237   
Holocaust denial is protected speech in some states (United States), while 
criminalized in others (Germany). The German Basic Law “was intended as an 
unwavering repudiation of the country’s Nazi past, thus fostering a constitutional identity 
that strongly encourages full integration of German Jews within the post-war German 
polity.”238 
In Portugal, holocaust denial is not a crime itself, but there can be criminalization 
through the prohibition of incitement to hatred. Article 236 of the Portuguese Penal Code 
rules that “anyone who, publicly and repeatedly, incites hatred against a people with the 
intention of triggering a war, is punished with imprisonment from 6 months to 3 years”. 
Additionally, article 240, § 2, b) foresees that “anyone who, in a public meeting, in writing 
intended for disclosure or through any means of social communication defames or injures 
a person or group of persons on account of their race, colour, ethnic or national origin or 
religion, including denial of war crimes or peace and humanity; with the intention of 
 
235 Cited above. See also PCC Ruling no. 578/2014, 28.08.2014.  
236 M. H. QC and R. Sandberg, “The Right to Blaspheme”, Blasphemy and Freedom of Expression – 
Comparative, Theoretical and Historical Reflections after the Charlie Hebdo Massacre (ed. J. Temperman 
and A. Koltay), Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 114-136, p. 118.  
237 J. de S. e Brito, “Religion and Criminal Law in Portugal”, Religion and Criminal Law. Religion et Droit 
Pénal (eds. M. Kotiranta & N. Doe), Leuven, Peeters, 2013, pp. 215-223, and N. Doe, Law and Religion in 
Europe – A Comparative Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 65-78.  
238 M. Rosenfeld, “Constitutional Identity”, cit., p. 774.  
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inciting racial or religious discrimination or encouraging it, shall be punished with 
imprisonment from 6 months to 5 years.” 
Burning the national flag is not covered by freedom of speech. In fact, the national 
flag is a symbol of Portugal’s sovereignty. According to article 11, § 1, “The National 
Flag, which is the symbol of the sovereignty of the Republic and of Portugal’s 
independence, unity and integrity, is that adopted by the Republic formed by the 
Revolution of the 5th of October 1910”.  
It is true that the protection of the dignity of national symbols is not absolute and 
must be compromised with other constitutional values, such as freedom of speech, 
religious freedom and freedom of cultural creation.239 If some doctrine alerts that active 
manifestations of commitment to the national flag might be arguable (such as the 
mandatory participation in public acts of patriotism), a passive or non-aggressive fidelity 
to the national symbol is a civic and legal duty.240  
Therefore, both the Portuguese Penal Code and the Military Justice Code241 
prohibit burning the flag. Article 332, § 1 of the Penal Code states that: “Anyone who 
publicly, by words, gestures or dissemination of writing, or by other means of 
communication with the public, shall violate the Republic, national flag or anthem, arms 
or emblems of Portuguese sovereignty, or disrespect them, shall be punished with 
imprisonment up to 2 years or with a fine of up to 240 days.” Specifically related to the 
military forces, article 102 of the Military Justice Code asserts the following: “The 
military person who publicly, by words, gestures or by dissemination of writings or by 
other means of communication with the public, insults the national flag, banner or 
national anthem, or lacks them respect, is punished: a) In time of war, with the penalty of 
1 to 4 years of imprisonment; b) In peacetime, with a sentence of 1 month to 2 years in 
prison.” 
Additionally, article 7, § 2, a) of the Code of Publicity affirms: “Advertising shall 
be prohibited if: (a) Institutions, national or religious symbols or historical characters are 
deprecated”.242, and article 17, § 4 foresees that: “it is forbidden to associate advertising 
 
239 See J. Miranda, “Anotação ao artigo 11.º”, Constituição Portuguesa Anotada, vol. I, cit., pp. 199-206, 
p. 202.  
240 A. de Araújo, “A Nação e os seus símbolos (Breves comentários ao artigo 11.º da Constituição”, Revista 
O Direito, 133, 2001, pp. 197 ff, p. 223.  
241 Law no. 100/2003, 15.11.2003.  
242 Law no. 330/90, 23.10.1990. 
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of alcoholic beverages with national symbols, enshrined in Article 11 of the Constitution 
of the Portuguese Republic.” 
To some scholars, the ratio legis of this restrictive legislation is not patriotism or 
the advocacy of a collective sense of belonging, but the preservation of public peace.243  
In respect to foreign flags or political flags, we did not find similar legislation. 
Here, freedom of speech and freedom of cultural creation should play a significant role. 
However, it would not be admissible to burn a flag that belongs to another person or to 
public entities. In that situation, we should apply the general civil law rules on the 
illegality of destroying the property of others. 
 
1.3. Free speech and new technologies 
 New technologies are a challenge in modern times. The new EU Regulation has 
been wildly discussed, both with enthusiasm and scepticism.244 How can the current 
digital era of over-sharing be compatible with privacy?245 How to draw a line between 
the “optimism of freedom of expression” and the “dark side of Internet’s freedom”, which 
seems to feed the hate speech and discrimination?246 Is there a right to be forgotten?  
There are substantial differences in the way freedom of speech and privacy are 
perceived on both sides of the Atlantic: The United States of America and Western 
Europe. For example, as regards the “right to be forgotten” – anchored on human dignity, 
personal identity, development of personality, honour, good name and reputation, image, 
and privacy –  I have identified a crescendo of protection depending on the jurisdiction 
that applies it: the US Supreme Court (minimalism); the European Court of Human Rights 
(compromise) and the ECJ (maximalism).247 
In Portugal, article 35 protects the use of information technology. In particular, 
article 35, § 1 grants “every citizen (…) the right of access to all computerized data that 
concern them, which they may require to be corrected and updated, and the right to be 
 
243 J. Raposo, “O crime de ‘ultraje aos símbolos nacionais’ nos direitos português e norte-americano. Uma 
análise comparativa sobre as questões do bem jurídico tutelado e da legitimidade constitucional da 
intervenção penal”, Estudos em Homenagem ao Conselheiro José Manuel Cardoso da Costa, Coimbra 
Editora, Coimbra, 2003, pp. 795-833, p. 824.   
244 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 27 April 2016, on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).  
245 C. S. Botelho, “Novo ou velho direito?... cit., p. 51.  
246 A. Sajó e C. Ryan, “Judicial reasoning and new technologies: framing, newness, fundamental rights and 
the internet”, The Internet and Constitutional Law – The protection of fundamental rights and constitutional 
adjudication in Europe (ed. O. Pollicino and G. Romeo), Routledge, 2016, pp. 3-25, p. 4. 
247 C. S. Botelho, “Novo ou velho direito?... cit., pp. 67-69.  
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informed of the purpose for which they are intended, as laid down by law.” Article 35, § 
3 asserts that “information technology may not be used to treat data concerning 
philosophical or political convictions, party or trade union affiliations, religious faith, 
private life or ethnic origins, except with the express consent of the data subject, or with 
an authorization provided for by law and with guarantees of non-discrimination, or for 
the purpose of processing statistical data that are not individually identifiable.”248    
Private and public interests in personal data motivated the Portuguese legislator 
to create the Portuguese Data Protection Authority (CNPD), an independent body which 
supervises and monitors compliance with the laws and regulations in the area of personal 
data protection.249 Its previous consultation on legal provisions relating to the processing 
of personal data is mandatory.  
“In October 2015, the CNPD pronounced itself against parliamentary legislation 
(Decree no. 426/XII) that allowed intelligence officers from the Security Information 
Service (SIS) and the Strategic and Defence Information Service (SIED) to access traffic, 
localization and other electronic communications-related data, for purposes of prevention 
of phenomena such as terrorism, espionage, sabotage, and highly organised crime, as long 
as certain conditions (necessity, appropriateness, and proportionality) were respected.250  
The legislative goal was not to access the content of communications (written or 
voice) but to obtain authorisation to demand the metadata (data about data) from the 
entities that treat data, concurring the conditions under which communications took place 
(location and traffic).  
Two months later, and following the request of prior control from the former 
President of the Republic Aníbal Cavaco Silva, the PPC took the view that the legislation 
was in breach of article 34, § 4 of the Constitution, which prohibits public authorities 
from engaging in any form of intrusion into communications other than in the cases 
provided for in criminal procedural law.251  
In August 2017, Organic Law 4/2017 was published, regulating the access of SIS 
and SIED to telecommunications and Internet data outside criminal proceedings. The 
novelty in this legislative reformulation is judicial supervision and prior authorization for 
 
248 M. P. R. de Faria, “Anotação ao artigo 35.º”, in J. Miranda e R. Medeiros, Constituição Portuguesa 
Anotada, vol. I, cit., pp. 779-801, pp. 796-798. 
249 A.de S. Pinheiro, Privacy e protecção de dados pessoais: a construção dogmática do direito à identidade 
informacional, AAFDL Editora, Lisboa, 2015, p. 733. For more information on the CNPD, see: 
https://www.cnpd.pt/  
250 Opinion no. 51/2015.  
251 Ruling no. 403/15, 27th of December, 2015. 
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access to telecommunication and Internet data, carried out by a group of judges from the 
Supreme Court of Justice. 
The CNPD, which had already decided against the previous legislation proposal, 
reaffirmed that, since access to data is carried out within the scope of criminal prevention, 
and therefore outside the constitutional scope of criminal proceedings by the SIS and 
SIED, both non-criminal investigation bodies, this act is still in violation of the 
aforementioned constitutional rules and principles.252 Even acknowledging that it is a 
“high-level judicial control”, the CNPD problematizes its operability, because the 
absence of “a clear and standardized procedure (...) constitutes a very considerable 
obstacle to the legality and constitutionality of the remedy”. More specifically, the 
legislation “infringes the prohibition of intrusion in the electronic communications 
provided for in the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, as well as the rules of the 
Constitution, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European 
Convention on Human Rights”.   
On the 14th of August, the current President of the Republic Marcelo Rebelo de 
Sousa promulgated the diploma, invoking the “broad consensus was reached in order to 
overcome the doubts that had given rise to the previous request for preventive 
constitutional review”, as well as “the relevance of the regime in question for the defence 
of the Democratic Rule of Law, in particular for the protection of fundamental rights». 
The radical-left parties (Communist Party and Left Bloc) requested successive control of 
constitutionality to the Portuguese Constitutional Court (articles 281 and 282).”253  
On the 18th September 2019, in a long ruling with several concurring and dissented 
opinions, the PCC declared some of the norms unconstitutional on the grounds of 
violation of articles 26, §1 (personal rights), 35, § 1 and 4 (use of information technology) 
and 18, § 2 (proportionality principle on the restriction of constitutional rights).254 
 
1.4. Legal traditions on free speech 
H. Patrick Glenn envisions ‘legal tradition’ as normative information.255 
Accordingly, I can verify that freedom of speech is of paramount importance in the 
 
252 Opinion no. 38/2017, 30th of May, 2017. 
253 C. S. Botelho, “Portugal: The State of Liberal Democracy”, cit., pp. 230-234. 
254 No. 464/2019.  
255 H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World – Sustainable diversity in law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2014, p. 56. Pointing out some conceptual weaknesses of this thesis, see Thomas Duve, “Legal 
traditions: A dialogue between comparative law and comparative legal history”, Comparative Legal 
History, 6 (1), 2018, pp. 15-33. 
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current  Portuguese historical and political contexts, after having endured almost five 
decades of dictatorship. Still, the commitment to freedom of speech is even deeper in the 
USA or Australia. Portugal’s constitutional model, as Germany’s or Brazil’s, share the 
same inspirational source of human dignity. That is why some scholars jokingly argue 
that “Europeans are from Venus and Americans are from Mars”256.   
Looking for some axiological grounding, some oppose European 
constitutionalism – a constitutionalism of dignity – to American constitutionalism, a 
constitutionalism of liberty257. To me, though, it seems somehow insular to see them as 
antagonistic legal concepts, since none of them truly exists without the other258. History 
teaches us why it is relevant to associate both concepts and stand up for a dignified 
freedom and free dignity259.  
As previously stated, although PCC jurisprudence lacks leading cases regarding 
the place and meaning of freedom of speech, the Portuguese State has been frequently 
condemned by the European Court of Human Rights for limiting free speech.  
Regarding religion, the Portuguese Constitution rules that the state should be 




2. Freedom of movement 
2.1. Does EU law give room to an autonomous national regulation?  
Article 8, § 1 and 2 of the Portuguese Constitution addresses the hierarchical 
relation between constitution and international law. In this sense, most global and regional 
international law norms will be placed beneath the constitution.260  
 
256 R. Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, apud J. E. K. Murkens, 
“Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Reflections on the Originalists’ Objections”, Verfassung 
und Recht in Übersee, 41 (1), 2008, pp. 32-50, p. 36.  
257 D, P. Kommers, “Comparative Constitutional Law… cit., p. 64.  
258 C. S. Botelho, Os direitos sociais em tempos de crise, cit., p. 113.  
259 R. Medeiros, “Direitos, liberdades e garantias e direitos sociais: entre a unidade e a diversidade”, Estudos 
em homenagem ao Prof. Doutor Sérvulo Correia (ed. J. Miranda), IV, Coimbra Editora, 2010, pp. 657-
683, em especial, pp. 659-660.  
260 Except for ius cogens norms, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article 16, § 2), and the 
European Union treaties. See F. U. Calvão, M. F. Campos & C. S. Botelho, Introdução ao Direito Público, 
4.ª ed., Almedina, 2017, pp. 127-131.  
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With respect to the relation between the Portuguese constitution and European 
Union law, article 7, § 6 of the Constitution rules the following261: “Subject to reciprocity 
and with respect for the fundamental principles of a democratic state based on the rule of 
law and for the principle of subsidiarity, and with a view to the achievement of the 
economic, social and territorial cohesion of an area of freedom, security and justice and 
the definition and implementation of a common external, security and defence policy, 
Portugal may agree to the joint exercise, in cooperation with the Union’s institutions, of 
the powers needed to construct and deepen the European Union.” 
Yet, the “most profound adaptation” 262 of the Portuguese Constitution to 
European integration was through the constitutional amendment of 2004, which 
introduced article 8, § 4: “The provisions of the treaties that govern the European Union 
and the norms issued by its institutions in the exercise of their respective competences 
are applicable in Portuguese internal law in accordance with Union law and with respect 
for the fundamental principles of a democratic state based on the rule of law.”  
Before 2004, primacy of EU law over constitutional law was arguable, since 
article 277 clearly undermines with unconstitutionally “norms that contravene the 
provisions of the Constitution or the principles enshrined therein.” Following the example 
of the Irish Constitution,263 the Portuguese Constitution joined the small group of 
European national constitutions which expressly recognize EU supremacy over national 
constitutional law.264  
Article 8, § 4 “does not imply a constitutional surrender”265, but it stresses the 
primacy of European Union law over all national norms – constitutional or 
infraconstitutional – if “the fundamental principles of a democratic state based on the rule 
of law” are respected.266  
Hence, the Portuguese Constitution recognizes the primacy of EU law “as long as 
both legal systems are compatible in systemic terms.”267 As Miguel Poiares Maduro 
 
261 Added in the constitutional amendment of 1992 and expanded (in 2001) to accommodate the third pillar 
of Maastricht. 
262 V. Moreira, “A CRP e a União Europeia”, cit., p. 881.  
263 Article 29, § 6.  
264 Idem, p. 882.  
265 F. P. Coutinho and N. Piçarra, “Portugal: The Impact of European Integration… cit., p. 606. Similarly, 
M. L. Duarte, “Sobre o caso Gauweiler. Estará o Tribunal de Justiça pronto a fazer o que for necessário 
para preservar o primado da União Europeia?”, Estudos em Homenagem ao Conselheiro Presidente Rui 
Moura Ramos, Almedina, Coimbra, vol. I, 2016, pp. 749-765, p. 763.  
266 C. S. Botelho, “Novo ou velho direito?... cit., p. 59. 
267 F. P. Coutinho and N. Piçarra, “Portugal: The Impact of European Integration… cit., p. 602.  
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metaphorically described, “contra-punctual legal techniques” harmonize different 
melodies (law systems) which are not in a hierarchical relation.268   
During almost five decades of the right-wing authoritarian regime of Salazar 
(“Estado Novo”), until 1974, freedom of movement was highly restricted. Although 
hundreds of thousands of Portuguese escaped to France, Canada, United States and other 
destinations, illegal emigration was then considered a crime punishable with jail time.269  
In the current Portuguese Constitution, freedom of movement is deeply connected 
with other constitutional rights, such as Right to freedom and security (article 27), 
freedom of conscience, of religion and of form of worship (article 41), right to meet and 
to demonstrate (article 45), freedom to choose a profession and of access to the public 
service (article 47), right to work (article 58), or the right to education, culture and science 
(article 73).270 
Article 44, § 1 grants every citizen the right to travel and settle freely in any part 
of Portuguese territory. Additionally, every citizen is guaranteed the right to emigrate or 
to leave Portuguese territory and the  right to return thereto” (article 44, § 2). Considering 
EU competence on the subject, the scope left for the national regulation of this right is 
very limited. In fact, the Portuguese state has autonomy regarding immigration from 
outside de EU.  
Still, both freedom of movement and the Portuguese legal economic arena are not 
entirely parallel to the EU arena: (i) the European principles in this matter are very 
abstract; (ii) there is always some degree of flexibility while implementing EU 
legislation.271  
 
2.2. Legal traditions on freedom of movement  
There is no resistance to the supranational push towards an EU-wide guarantee of 
freedom of movement. Again, there are no national rules in place against social dumping 
or eco-dumping. Industrial policy is extremely dependent on EU law.  
 
268  M. P. Maduro, A Constituição Plural – Constitucionalismo e União Europeia, Principia, Cascais, 2006, 
pp. 50-51, and “Europe and the constitution: what if this is as good as it gets?”, European Constitutionalism 
beyond the State (eds. J. H. H. Weiler and M. Wind), Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp 74-102. 
Adhering to Maduro’s methodological approach, see J. Komárek, “European Constitutionalism and the 
European Arrest Warrant: In Search of Limits of ‘Contrapuntal Principles’”, Common Market Law Review, 
44, 2007, pp. 30-39. 
269 Jorge Miranda, “Anotação ao artigo 44.º”, Constituição Portuguesa Anotada, vol. I, cit., pp. 938-941, 
p. 939.  
270 Idem, ibidem.  
271 Luís S. Cabral de Moncada, Direito Económico, Almedina, Coimbra, 7th ed., 2018, p. 128.  
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 As to the existence of rules against industrial relocation abroad, this subject is 
related to international trade and, therefore, regulated by the World Trade Organization. 
Still, Portugal allows inbound and outbound cross-border transfers of a company’s seat.272 
 With respect to the Portuguese economic Constitution and as explained before (I. 
2.3), some doctrine considers several constitutional norms to be obsolete and not in tune 
with EU law.273 As examples, one can mention paragraph c) of article 80 (freedom of 
entrepreneurial initiative and organisation, within the overall framework of a mixed 
economy), article 87 (foreign economic activity and investment), or even paragraph g) of 
article 288 (the existence of economic plans, within the framework of a mixed economy). 
 
 
3. Judicial independence  
3.1. Judiciary organization in Portugal  
The Portuguese Constitutional Court (PCC) is the court “with the specific 
competence to administer justice in matters of a constitutional-law nature” (article 221). 
It is composed of thirteen Justices, ten of whom are appointed by the Assembly of the 
Republic (which requires a two-thirds majority) and three are co-opted by those ten 
(article 222, § 1). Six of the judges (either appointed by the parliament or are co-opted) 
are necessarily career magistrates (mostly from the Supreme Court of Justice or from the 
Supreme Administrative Court). The other six are jurists, usually law professors, or 
professional politicians with a law degree (article 222, § 2).  
The elected judges tend to reflect the political composition of the parliament at the 
time of the election, as their names are extracted from a unique list negotiated by the main 
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parties. Thus, the PCC “broadly reflects parliamentary preferences without major bias 
against either of the two main blocks (left or right).”274  
Constitutional judges are elected for a non-renewable term of nine years (before 
1997’s constitutional amendment, the mandate was for six years and renewable for a 
second period in office).275   
Under article 209, § 1 of the Constitution, “in addition to the Constitutional Court, 
there shall be the following categories of court:  a) The Supreme Court of Justice and the 
courts of law of first and second instance;276  b) The Supreme Administrative Court and 
the remaining administrative and tax courts;277 c) The Court of Auditors”.278 In addition, 
provisions are also made for “maritime courts, arbitration tribunals and justices of the 
peace.” (article 209, § 2).    
The ordinary courts with civil and criminal jurisdiction are the judicial courts, 
which are organized in a descending order of hierarchical rank and territorial scope: the 
Supreme Court (with jurisdiction over the entire country), the courts of appeal (per 
judicial district) and the district courts (first instance).  
The Supreme Court of Justice, currently constituted by around 60 Justices, is the 
higher body in the hierarchy of judicial courts, and functions as a Plenary Court, in 
Plenary Specialized Chambers, and by Chambers.279 The Plenary Specialized Chambers 
function on the same terms as the Plenary Court and are competent to judge the President 
of the Republic, the President of the Assembly of the Republic, and the Prime Minister 
for any crime committed during the term of their office. It is the chambers’ duty, 
according to their respective specialization, to judge cases of crimes committed by judges 
of the Supreme Court of Justice, judges of the Courts of Appeal, and magistrates of the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office working in such Courts, or persons treated as such, as well as 
actions forwarded against them because of their duties. 
Access to the position of judge near the Supreme Court of Justice is made through 
a merit curricular invitation by judges of the Courts of Appeal, to magistrates belonging 
to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and to other jurists of merit, on the following proportion 
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for each five vacancies: three for the first ones, one for the second ones, and one for the 
latter. The judges of the Courts of Appeal who are in the first fourth of the seniority list, 
and do not officially waive the invitation to tender, are necessary contesters; the 
remaining are deemed voluntary contesters. 
The President of Supreme Court of Justice is elected by its Justices (article 210, § 
1), by secret ballot, for a three-year term of office, which can be renewable once by re-
election. The President of the Supreme Court of Justice is also, inherently, the President 
of the Higher Judicial Council, which is the management disciplinary body of the 
judicature (judicial appointments, placements, transfers and promotions). The Council is 
composed by two councillors appointed by the President of the Republic, seven 
councillors elected by Parliament, and seven judges elected by their peers.  
The Supreme Administrative Court is the senior organ in the hierarchy of 
administrative and tax courts (article 212, § 1).280 The administrative courts include the 
first instance administrative and tax courts, the central administrative courts (North and 
South) and the Supreme Administrative Court (covering the whole country). Conflicts of 
jurisdiction between courts are resolved by a Conflict Court, regulated by law.  
The Superior Council of Administrative and Tax Courts is chaired by the President 
of the Supreme Administrative Court and composed of the following members: two 
appointed by the President of the Republic; four elected by the Assembly of the Republic; 
and four judges elected by their peers, in accordance with the principle of proportional 
representation”.281 
Taking into consideration the PCC and the ordinary supreme courts, it is relevant 
to mention that there is no “campaign” or lobbying, nor the issue of campaign finance for 
judicial elections.  
Regarding judicial councils in general, some scholars worry that judicial councils 
mainly composed by magistrates might hinder accountability and be used to pursue the 
corporate interests of magistrates.282 In several states, such as in Italy, Spain, Portugal and 
France, measures have been taken in order to prevent the politization of these autonomous 
judicial bodies.283  
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In Portugal, the Higher Judicial Council is chaired by the President of the Supreme 
Court of Justice and also comprises the following ordinary members:  two members 
appointed by the President of the Republic; seven elected by the Assembly of the 
Republic, and seven judges elected by their peers in harmony with the principle of 
proportional representation (article 218, § 1).  
The judicial councils are competent for the recruitment of judicial personnel, on 
matters of professional evaluation for the promotion of judges, and for disciplining judges 
as well (article 214). Their main goal is the promotion and protection of judicial 
independence. Judicial and administrative judges are appointed for life and cannot 
exercise another public or private job.  
 
3.2. Judicial independence  
 Articles 202-224 of the Portuguese Constitution outline the principles underlying 
the administration of justice and the workings of the courts in Portugal. Courts are “the 
entities that exercise sovereignty with the competence to administer justice in the name 
of the people” (article 202, § 1). Furthermore, “courts are independent and subject only 
to the law” (article 203).  
 Judicial independence is of paramount importance to the right to an effective 
remedy and fair trial. In the case Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, the ECJ 
ruled that “the principle of the effective judicial protection of individuals’ rights under 
EU law (…) is a general principle of EU law stemming from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States”.284 In this sense, “the factors to be taken into account in 
assessing whether a body is a ‘court or tribunal’ include, inter alia, whether the body is 
established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, 
whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law and whether it is 
independent.”285 
Although in many civil law states (contrary to common law states) the executive 
is primarily responsible for court administration, in Portugal, court administration is the 
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responsibility of the judiciary.286 In fact, “there are certain indications that with respect to 
formal guarantees of judicial independence, Italy, Portugal, and Spain differ significantly 
from the other civil law countries, in providing for appointment of judges by and vesting 
responsibility for court administration in a judicial body.”287 
In Portugal, the existence of independent judicial councils is not an undemocratic 
judicial self-government in which judges can largely determine decisions about their 
careers and discipline. Instead, what we have is an autonomous judicial government, 
separated from the executive, in which judges are in the minority vis-à-vis the members 
elected by Parliament and appointed by the President of the Republic, by criteria of 
political convenience. Therefore, de jure and de facto, judicial councils are  controlled by 
the organs of sovereignty directly legitimized by the vote: the President and the 
parliament.288  
Additionally, the Government exercises budgetary control over the activity of the 
judiciary (including hiring staff and technical experts), which decisively influences not 
only judicial proficiency, but also the ability of a court to deliver its judgments in a 
reasonable time. The budget of the courts is prepared by the Ministry of Justice, according 
to information given by each law court.289 However, the Minister of Justice does not have 
any power over the activity of the judges. The Union Association of Judicial Magistrates 
is registered in the Ministry of Labour.  
Regarding disputes involving the highest authorities of the state, there are some 
special provisions. According to article 130, “The President of the Republic answers 
before the Supreme Court of Justice for crimes committed in the exercise of his functions.  
2. Proceedings may only be initiated by the Assembly of the Republic upon a motion 
subscribed by one fifth and a decision passed by a two-thirds majority of all the Members 
of the Assembly of the Republic in full exercise of their office. 3. Conviction implies 
removal from office and disqualification from re-election. 4. For crimes that are not 
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committed in the exercise of his functions, the President of the Republic answers before 
the common courts, once his term of office has ended.”  
As to members of the parliament, they “are not civilly or criminally liable for or 
subject to disciplinary proceedings in relation to their votes or the opinions they express 
in the exercise of their functions” (article 157, § 1). In the event that “criminal proceedings 
are brought against any member of the Assembly of the Republic and he is definitively 
charged, the Assembly shall decide whether or not he must be suspended so that the 
proceedings can take their course” (article 157, § 4).  
Focusing on the Portuguese government, which comprises “the Prime Minister, 
the Ministers and the Secretaries and Under Secretaries of State” (article 183, § 1), “no 
member of the Government may be detained, arrested or imprisoned without the 
authorization of the Assembly of the Republic, except for a wilful crime punishable by 
imprisonment for more than three years and in flagrante delicto” (article 196, § 1).  
 
3.3. Legal traditions on judicial independence 
Court’ independence is a core guarantee of the democratic rule of law and 
umbilically linked with the separation of powers (article 2). In fact, to avoid political 
interference in the selection and day-to-day activity of the courts, the Portuguese 
Constitution grants courts full independence, not only towards other sovereign organs, 
but also among themselves (besides courts hierarchy).290  
Portuguese independent judicial councils are a form of an autonomous judicial 
government and are de jure and de facto controlled by the organs of sovereignty directly 
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